Apr 02 2026| Nº. 199

Editorial

This week in Brasília, the contours of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s reelection effort came into sharper focus—if not yet into coherence. At a cabinet meeting on Tuesday,  March 31, Chief of Staff Rui Costa publicly needled communications secretary Sidônio Palmeira, questioning whether the government’s achievements are reaching the public. The mild public rebuke reflected mounting concerns within the incumbent’s orbit over slipping approval ratings and the steady rise of far-right challengers Flávio Bolsonaro in polling. Reporting midweek suggested that Sidônio has been urging Lula to adopt a more assertive and frequent media presence, particularly on social media platforms the president has long treated with ambivalence. But the exchange exposed more than stylistic differences. It underscored an administration still searching, six months before the election, for a narrative capable of translating policy output into political support. There is time before the campaign begins in earnest, but the Lula campaign must soon articulate a clear and decisive message to voters if Lula is to win an unprecedented fourth term.

It also became clear this week that the opposition faces its own challenges in constructing an alternative third-way candidacy. The internal maneuvering of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) effectively sidelined Rio Grande do Sul governor Eduardo Leite, who joined the party in the hopes of being its presidential nominee. Instead the party put forth archconservative Ronaldo Caiado as the party’s presidential standard-bearer. By Wednesday, April 1, Leite had signaled he would remain in Rio Grande do Sul rather than pursue a diminished national bid, even as an external manifesto from centrist economists and politicians urged Leite to switch parties again in order to run for president. Caiado’s emergence, in turn, reflects movement without clear direction, promising to oppose both Lula and Bolsonaro even as he signals an openness to the key demands of the former president’s reactionary base. 

These political developments unfolded alongside renewed scrutiny of Brazil’s highest court. On Tuesday, March 31, Edson Fachin, chief justice of the Federal Supreme Court (STF), acknowledged mounting criticism of the court and argued that judges, like other public officials, must answer for their mistakes and misdeeds. His defense of a proposed judicial code of ethics, which faces internal resistance on the court, comes as the STF’s public standing is under strain, shaped by high-profile investigations and perceptions of overreach. Fachin’s remarks sought to reframe accountability as a democratic strength rather than a concession. Yet the timing is notable: as electoral competition intensifies and institutional pressures accumulate, the court’s effort to police itself risks becoming entangled in the very political disputes it aims to rise above.

Highlights

• Nominated. President Lula formalized this week the nomination of Jorge Messias to the Supreme Federal Court. The formalization of the nomination breaks a four-month impasse. Everyone knew that Lula would nominate Messias, but the president hesitated to proceed because his plans clashed with those of the Senate president, David Alcolumbre, who preferred another name for the open position: that of Senator Rodrigo Pacheco. The delay may have allowed Lula to reduce resistance to Messias, but the litmus test for the nomination will be his confirmation hearing in the Senate.

• House Arrest. Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes demanded explanations from former President Jair Bolsonaro's defense team regarding an action that may have violated the conditions of his house arrest. The request refers to a statement by one of the former president's sons, former congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, who, at a Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) event in the United States, said he would show his father images recorded on his cell phone of the support the event's audience was giving to Jair. The statement suggests a possible violation of the order prohibiting Jair Bolsonaro from accessing cell phones while serving his sentence at home. A violation of these conditions could nullify the benefit of house arrest, sending the former president back to prison.

• Gender. President Lula da Silva nominated the first woman to hold the rank of general in the Brazilian Army. Claudia Lima Gusmão Cacho is a pediatrician from Recife, Pernambuco, and joined the Force in 1996. There are currently 13,000 women in the Brazilian Army, representing 6% of the number of people in the armed forces. In the Navy, this percentage is 11%, and in the Air Force, 22%.

2026 Election Observatory

New website. The International Observatory of the 2026 Elections page is now live. On it, the Brazil Office Alliance and The Brazilian Report present information about the Brazilian electoral process in October of this year, explaining which political parties and candidates are involved in the race, as well as explaining how the voting machines work and presenting the main polls on the approval of the current government and voting intentions. Also in April, subscribers to this Brazil Office newsletter will begin receiving a new weekly publication entirely dedicated to the elections. Read more.

CPAC. Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro and Lula's main rival in the October presidential elections, spoke this week in Dallas, Texas, during Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), a traditional gathering of the American far-right. Flávio repeated to his audience in the United States the same false information he spreads in Brazil, about non-existent fraud in the electoral system, about an alleged dictatorship led by Lula and the justices of the Supreme Federal Court, and about unfounded accusations of links between the Brazilian president and organized crime and China.

Electoral calendar. Politicians intending to run for office in the October elections this year have until the end of this week to resign from their positions as governors and mayors – with the exception of those seeking re-election to the same post. The measure also applies to governmental ministers. This April 4th, therefore marks, the deadline for parties to publicly announce their candidates for the upcoming elections.

News from ABO and social organizations and movements:

Black Movement. Aqualtune's Executive Co-Director Ana Carolina Lima participated this week in an important debate on "Black advocacy and the right to exist in the justice system," broadcast on the Iaras e Pagus – Palavras Pretas channel on YouTube. The lawyer, a member of the Black Lawyers Front, a member of the National Council and advisor to the Amnesty Commission, spoke about the struggle of the Black population for space in society, particularly in the legal profession and the Brazilian judicial system.

Memory and Justice. Human rights activists and former political prisoners held another edition of the "Walk of Silence" this Sunday, March 29, an act in defense of democracy and to denounce the state violence that occurred during the military dictatorship and persists to this day. The demonstration began in front of the 36th Police District, where the DOI-Codi, the main torture center during the period of Brazil most severe repression, operated in the southern area of the capital of São Paulo.

USA and Brazil. In his most recent column, written for Agência Pública, James N. Green, president of the Board of Directors of the Brazil Office, discusses the complex relationship between the USA and Brazil regarding the defense of democracy and support for coups d'état throughout history. Green revisits the events of 1964 and analyzes them in comparison with aspects of the current moment, in which the Brazilian far-right is calling for American interference that once again puts democracy in the country at risk. Read more.

Itamaraty. LGBTQIA+ rights organizations that are part of the WBO held a series of strategic meetings in Brasília in early April. The dialogue between representatives of civil society, Itamaraty, embassies, and other actors focused on aligning priorities, strengthening, and consolidating a joint framework for international action. The meetings allowed for the exchange of analyses on the global scenario and the construction of joint responses to challenges impacting LGBTQIA+ agendas in Brazil and the region in a context of crisis of multilateralism. The meetings aim to strengthen advocacy within human rights systems, both regionally and universally, strategically addressing issues of regression, keeping people at the center.

Cerrado and Caatinga. Organizations and leaders of traditional peoples and communities (PCTs) met in an assembly organized by the Cerrado Network on March 26 to approve a motion supporting the adoption of the land regularization decree for traditional territories. The meeting consolidated a strategic space for political articulation, in which PCTs advanced in a coordinated manner in the defense of their rights and the protection of the biome. Land regularization was highlighted as a central measure to guarantee territorial security, reduce conflicts, and contain environmental degradation. More than a local demand, the initiative shows that the future of the Cerrado—essential for water security, biodiversity, and climate balance—depends directly on the recognition of the rights of these peoples, reaffirming their role as indispensable actors in the ecological sustainability of the region.

Feature Article

Changing the Name Doesn't Change the Problem: How Can the United States Truly Contribute to the Security of Brazil and Latin America?

By Natália Pollachi* and Carolina Ricardo**

The United States has classified two Brazilian organized crime factions – the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and the Comando Vermelho (CV) – as threats to regional security. Furthermore, the country is flirting with the possibility of classifying them as terrorist organizations, as it recently did with drug cartels in other countries in the region. This has reignited the debate about whether organized crime in Brazil could or should be classified as terrorist. Making this classification, however, would be a mistake for several technical, legal, and practical reasons. Below, we list some of them and present an alternative for more productive cooperation in combating organized crime.

Brazilian criminal organizations do not typically use terrorist tactics, which, according to Brazilian law, are defined as those intended to generate terror or attack specific social groups. The violent actions of Brazilian organized crime, on the other hand, are limited to confrontations with state forces and disputes among themselves. In terms of motivation, there is also a difference compared to terrorist groups – Brazilian factions are motivated by economic gains and the pursuit of political or legal protection, not by an identity or ideological project. Classifying them as terrorists would open the door to a series of exceptional actions, such as increasing the already shameful rate of police lethality. At the same time, it would create justifications for foreign actions on national territory.

This does not mean that the problem of organized crime in Brazil is small or simple to solve. It only means that changing the name of the phenomenon will not help solve the problem. There are several concrete and short-term actions that the United States could take to truly help Brazil – as well as all of Latin America – to confront organized crime.

One of them is investing in combating the large flow of arms trafficking, such as rifles, submachine guns, and pistols that illegally leave the United States and supply these criminal organizations. In an analysis of the profile of all military-grade weapons seized in Brazil, published in an academic journal of the London School of Economics, we identified that the United States is the main foreign source of rifles for crime in Brazil. Analyzing emblematic cases, we see varied dynamics, including rifles whose last legal registration was due to purchases by American citizens or by importers and retailers legally operating in the United States. Years later, these same rifles are seized from Brazilian organized crime. We see shipments of complete weapons or the illegal shipment of parts and components for assembly by crime organizations here. This phenomenon affects not only Brazil, but is also widely documented in Mexico and other countries in the region.

Improving control of its own borders, ports, and airports, and holding those involved in arms trafficking accountable, is a direct responsibility of the United States government and does not imply changing any domestic regulations, only ensuring the application of existing laws. This measure would have an immediate impact on drastically reducing the availability of military-grade weapons, which is what allows organized crime groups to exert their territorial dominance, confront the police, and victimize our population. If this effective control existed, there would be a mutual benefit, as it would also impact the reduction of the supply of illegal drugs and indicators of violence that contribute to the demand for immigration to the United States.

At this moment when the Lula and Trump governments are coordinating agendas for a face-to-face meeting, it is essential that this issue be on the agenda. Of course, Brazil has much to do regarding its domestic challenges, but the same could be said of the U.S. government regarding the arms trafficking that leaks daily from its own territory. This may be a contribution with less media appeal, but it is the most effective action and directly within the country's reach.

Natália Pollachi is project director at the Sou da Paz Institute and Carolina Ricardo is executive director of the Sou da Paz Institute

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.