May 2 2025| Nº. 164

Editorial

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is considering firing Social Security Minister Carlos Lupi amid growing frustration over his handling of a scandal involving unauthorized deductions from retiree benefits, which has shaken public trust in the government. Despite days of public scrutiny, Lupi failed to offer concrete solutions or even name a replacement for the former head of the public pension system—known as the Brazilian Social Security Institute (INSS)—who was dismissed by Lula. Taking matters into his own hands, the president bypassed Lupi and appointed prosecutor Gilberto Waller Júnior as the new head of the INSS. Lula gave Waller full autonomy to implement structural reforms and clean up the agency, reflecting a broader lack of confidence in Lupi’s leadership. While Lupi is not accused of direct involvement in the R$6.3 billion scheme, his sluggish response has drawn sharp criticism from within the administration, and Lula is reportedly now weighing his removal. This would come with some political cost, however, as Lupi heads the Democratic Labor Party (PDT). Although the PDT is a relatively small part of Lula’s governing coalition, the president cannot afford to lose support given his policy priorities this year.

This week also marked the first meeting of BRICS foreign ministers since the bloc’s expansion last year. The gathering, held on April 29 in Rio de Janeiro, marked a significant test for the newly enlarged group, which now includes 11 countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran. While Brazil, which currently holds the rotating BRICS presidency, managed to secure a statement condemning unfair global trade practices and protectionist environmental measures—issues of direct concern to its economy—deep divisions emerged over United Nations Security Council reform. A proposal previously backed by the original BRICS members to support Brazil, India, and South Africa for permanent seats unraveled as Egypt and Ethiopia pushed back against South Africa’s candidacy, exposing regional rivalries within the expanded bloc. Brazilian diplomats acknowledged the disappointment but stressed that the meeting laid the groundwork for further negotiations ahead of the July BRICS leaders’ summit, where they hope to forge a broader consensus on reform, trade cooperation using local currencies, and efforts to preserve the multilateral trade system without directly confronting global powers like the United States or European Union.

On the positive side for Lula, a new poll this week registered a slight uptick in his approval ratings, reversing a year-long decline amid easing inflation and improved economic outlooks. This came as Congress debates a new compromise bill that could reduce prison sentences for minor participants in the January 8, 2023 insurrection while toughening penalties for its leaders—an alternative to a broader amnesty supported by supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro. Senator Randolfe Rodrigues, a key Lula ally, described the proposal as “a hand extended toward national reconciliation,” emphasizing that it seeks justice without granting amnesty to those who orchestrated the attempted coup. 

Highlights

• Labor Day. President Lula decided not to attend the May 1 celebrations, International Workers' Day, organized by Brazilian trade unions this year. Last year, Lula attended an event that had low attendance, which was interpreted as a reflection of disorganization and lack of prestige on the part of both the president and the unions. The Brazilian trade union sector has been severely hit by successive restrictive policies adopted by the governments of Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. In a video posted on social media, Lula praised his government's achievements in the labor area.

• Work schedule. One of the reasons for the tension on May 1st is the pressure from workers to end the 6x1 work shift, in which employees work six days a week and only have one day off. Federal deputy Erika Hilton has filed a Proposed Constitutional Amendment to reduce the workday. The idea is good for workers, but it worries employers, who have a strong presence in Congress, including those who support the Lula government.

• Collor arrested. Former Brazilian president Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) was arrested last week, accused of corruption and money laundering in a case involving the misappropriation of funds from BR Distribuidora, a subsidiary of the Brazilian oil company Petrobras. The Brazilian Supreme Course issued a sentence of 8 years and 10 months in prison.  Collor will serve his sentence in Maceió in the state of Alagoas in a special cell in a regular prison, but this week the Attorney General's Office requested that he be allowed to serve his sentence at home. Collor made history in 1992 as the first Brazilian president to be impeached. Since then, he has continued his political career, with great strength in his home state, where he controls the main media outlets.

• Transphobia. Federal deputy Nikolas Ferreira, one of the greatest exponents of the young wing of the Brazilian far right, was sentenced by the Federal District Court to pay R$200,000 in collective moral damages for having worn a blonde wig, ridiculing transgender people, during a speech from the pulpit of the National Congress in March 2023. The money should go to a fund for the Defense of Diffuse Rights, but the conviction can still be appealed.

News from ABO and social organizations and movements:

100 days of government. In his most recent column on the Agência Pública website, the president of the WBO Board of Directors, James N. Green, takes stock of the first hundred days of Donald Trump's government in the USA. In the text, Green reviews the main measures taken by the U.S. president at the beginning of his second term in the White House and also lists their disastrous effects, as well as increasingly organized and strong reactions from civil society.

Brazil Unfiltered. The latest edition of the WBO podcast, Brazil Unfiltered, features an interview with Rubens Glezer, a law professor at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo. Glezer explains Jair Bolsonaro's legal situation, lists the lawsuits against the former president, and explores the possible consequences for the leading figure on the Brazilian far right, who was involved in a failed coup attempt.

Janela Internacional. Jana Silverman, one of WBO's associate researchers, participated this week in the Janela Internacional program, hosted by the Perseu Abramo Foundation, hosted by Valter Pomar and Fábio El-Khouri. Together with James N. Green, she commented on the political, economic, and social scenario in the United States after Donald Trump's first hundred days in the White House.

Funding crisis. Gife – one of the most significant associations of private social investors in Brazil – published a brief analysis on the US-Induced International Financing Crisis and its impact on philanthropy in the Global South. The document can be read at the link.

Feature Article

What is the Legal Status of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil?

By David Tangerino*

Former President Jair Bolsonaro was indicted on February 18, 2025 by the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) for committing several crimes, including an attempted coup d'état, abolition of the democratic rule of law, and criminal organization, along with 33 other people. The Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) unanimously accepted the indictment on March 26, 2025, thus making him a defendant.

In summary, the accusation includes acts between July 29, 2021 and January 8, 2023. The initial milestone is a live broadcast by Bolsonaro, in which he attacks the electronic voting system without evidence in addition to claiming interference by Ministers of the STF and the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) in the elections. The basic text of the live broadcast is attributed to the then director of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), Alexandre Ramagem.

Linked to the speech, there was both a scheme to spread disinformation and to design administrative acts – the Attorney General's Office (AGU) would promote opinions that would protect civil servants, including those of the Federal Police, who refused to comply with “manifestly illegal” orders from the judiciary. Similar statements were made on August 3 and 4 of the same year and in the following years.

On September 7, 2021, the date of Brazil's Independence Day celebrations, Bolsonaro warned the then President of the STF, Luiz Fux, that “either the head of this power disciplines his own, or this power may suffer what we do not want”.

In 2022, a recording of a ministerial meeting on July 5 deserves to be highlighted. In addition to ordering all those present to publicly attack the electoral system, he announced that he would call a meeting with foreign ambassadors in Brazil to denounce the never-proven fraud in the elections, which took place on July 18, 2022). General Augusto Heleno stated that he had spoken with a Director of ABIN to infiltrate agents in the electoral campaigns. In this meeting, he stated that “if we have to turn the tables, it will be before the elections. (…) We will have to act. Act against certain institutions and against certain people.”

On October 30, 2022, the day of the second round of the general elections, the Federal Highway Police (PRF) implemented blitzes under the pretext of investigating allegations of vote buying that were carried out disproportionately throughout the country, massively favoring locations where Lula had received the most votes in the first round, according to previous mapping. The blockades were only lifted when the then-President of the TSE, Alexandre de Moraes, threatened to arrest Silvinei Vasques the head of the Federal Highway Police.

After Lula won the election, Argentine Fernando Cerimedo went live a few days later, on November 4, giving voice to a dossier prepared with false information, reiterating the rhetoric of fraud. The content was widely disseminated by members of the alleged criminal organization, despite the fact that – as pointed out in a message presented by collaborator Mauro Cid – they knew that no evidence had been found.

In November 2022, the “Green and Yellow Dagger” plan was drawn up, which foresaw the murder of Lula, his vice president, Geraldo Alckmin, and Alexandre de Moraes, whose death was said to be imminent). Operation Luneta was also discovered, strongly articulated around a document formally disguised as a State of Defense, but which imposed an illegal intervention in the TSE with the removal of justices. Said draft was allegedly presented to the commanders of the armed forces on 12/6/2022, with rejection by the army and prompt support by the navy.

At the same time, Bolsonaro's Liberal Party filed a lawsuit with the TSE to annul electronic voting machines manufactured before 2020, claiming that Lula would have gained an advantage over his opponent. Curiously, the annulment would only apply in the second round.

Finally, on January 8, 2023, people, who were mostly already camped in front of military buildings in Brasília, marched to Praça dos Três Poderes (Plaza of the Three Powers), were not stopped by the police forces, and vandalized the headquarters. The accusatory hypothesis is that the crowd would create a chaotic situation of chaos, triggering the imposition of the Law and Order Guarantee Operation (GLO), under the responsibility of the armed forces.

Following the criminal procedural rules, upon receipt of the complaint, the oral evidence production phase begins, first with prosecution witnesses, then defense witnesses, the interrogation of the collaborator (Mauro Cid, Bolsonaro's former aide-de-camp) and the other defendants. Except for the need to produce evidence about circumstances or facts that became known during the oral evidence phase, a period is opened for the PGR to present its arguments, and then for the defenses to state its case. The trial is public. Since a panel of the Supreme Court will hear the case, there is little possibility of appeals. Infringement appeals – to be judged by all the justices – would depend on two acquittal votes, out of the five on the panel. They would not be admissible if the divergence is about preliminary matters or penalties.

If convicted, Bolsonaro's sentence could range from 12 years and 8 months to 36 years and 8 months. In any case, the initial sentence would mean imprisonment. The trial is expected to take place in 2025.

*David Tangerino is a lawyer and professor at State University of Rio de Janeiro.

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.