May 8 2026| Nº. 204

Editorial

President Lula da Silva’s visit to Donald Trump in Washington generated positive reactions in Brazil and comes at a particularly delicate moment for both international politics and Brazilian democracy itself. Lula is seeking to reposition Brazil amid new geopolitical disputes, trade pressures, and the growing fragmentation of the international order. While he aims to reaffirm Brazil’s strategic role in areas such as democracy, energy (especially critical minerals) trade tariffs, and security, the meeting also carries inevitable domestic political implications, particularly given Brazil’s deep polarization and the continuing influence of Trumpism over sectors of the Brazilian far right. Following the meeting, President Trump used his social media platforms to describe Lula as “a very dynamic president” and stated that “the meeting went very well,” adding that “new meetings will be scheduled in the coming months, if necessary.”

On the domestic front, the Federal Police operation targeting Senator Ciro Nogueira, as part of corruption investigations linked to the Master Bank Case, adds a new layer of instability to Brazil’s pre-electoral landscape ahead of the October 2026 elections. A former Chief of Staff under Bolsonaro and one of the main political strategists of the conservative bloc in Congress, Nogueira had been mentioned as a possible vice-presidential candidate in a ticket led by Flávio Bolsonaro. The advancement of the investigations increases pressure on sectors of the opposition and reignites the debate over the limits of political power, campaign financing, economic influence, and institutional accountability in contemporary Brazil.

This week’s developments reinforce how deeply intertwined domestic politics and international affairs have become in Brazil. Alongside the early electoral disputes already underway, decisive debates remain open regarding governance, institutional resilience, public security, human rights, and environmental protection. Brazil approaches the 2026 elections under growing international scrutiny, not only because of the weight of its economy and strategic resources, but also because of the broader regional consequences that the direction of Brazilian democracy may produce across Latin America.
 

Highlights

• Coup Plotters. The Supreme Federal Court is expected to soon begin analyzing the changes proposed by the Brazilian Congress to the law concerning the penalties imposed on participants in the failed coup attempt of January 8, 2023. The so-called Sentencing Bill was promoted by opposition members of the Congress to reduce the penalties imposed on the coup plotters. Lula vetoed the bill, but Congress overturned the veto. The trend now is for the Supreme Court to avoid an open confrontation with the Congress, guaranteeing their right to legislate on the length of sentences stipulated in the laws. Lula's Workers’ Party questions the constitutionality of the measure.

• Governability. Lula is trying to rebuild his relationship with David Alcolumbre, the president of the Senate, after the strain caused by the veto of Jorge Messias's nomination for a seat on the Supreme Federal Court. Alcolumbre worked to veto Lula's nomination, causing damage to the president's image in an election year. This week, Lula tasked two ministers, the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Institutional Relations, with meeting with Alcolumbre, in what the press reported as the behind-the-scenes efforts for an rapprochement.

• Organized crime. This week, Brazil commemorated the 20th anniversary of the largest wave of attacks carried out by the criminal organization PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) in the state of São Paulo. At the time, more than 560 people were killed in actions coordinated by the group, which originated in the 1990s and has since expanded its operations into prisons and important sectors of the national economy. Today, the PCC is at the center of discussions between Brazil and the United States, due to the Trump administration's decision to classify the group, along with the CV (Comando Vermelho), as international terrorist organizations.

• Oil. Brazilian states are fighting over the distribution of oil exploration royalties. The case has reached the Supreme Court, which is expected to decide on the validity of a rule approved by Congress in 2012 that reduced the amount transferred to producing states, redistributing funds to non-producing states as well. In an election year, the debate gains importance, with politicians trying to claim the merits to increase the budgets of their states and municipalities.

News from ABO and social organizations and movements:

Lula-Trump. In an exclusive article, Paulo Abrão, executive director of the WBO, analyzes the political, economic, electoral, and security aspects surrounding the meeting between Presidents Lula and Trump in Washington. For him, the meeting is set against the undeniable backdrop of Brazil occupying an important and unavoidable position in international politics, as a strategic power in the Global South on issues related to the environment, human rights, democracy, and natural resources. Read here.

Cerrado and Caatinga. The Kalunga territory, in Chapada dos Veadeiros (GO), enters a historic milestone with the beginning of the process of being listed by IPHAN as a cultural heritage site of Brazil. The recognition involves approximately 8,000 people in 39 communities, the largest quilombo in the country, and seeks to protect the territory, ways of life, ancestral knowledge, and the memory of the Cerrado, Brazil’s savannah. Furthermore, the territory is in one of the most sensitive areas of the biome, under strong pressure from agribusiness, intensive tourism, and land grabbing. In this scenario, the protection of Kalunga is also a strategy for environmental conservation and the defense of the rights of traditional peoples and communities, fundamental for the preservation of the Cerrado's biodiversity. Although it represents progress in cultural and territorial recognition, the definitive land titling has not yet been completed and remains a historical debt of the Brazilian State.

Belo Monte. Civil society organizations working in the defense of human and socio-environmental rights published an open letter this week called Belo Monte: Ten Years of Operation, More Than a Decade of Damage Without Reparations. The document is signed by the Inter-American Association for the Defense of the Environment (AIDA), the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI), the Coordination of Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB), the Diocese of Altamira, Justiça Global, the Xingu Vivo Para Sempre Movement, the Observatory of Isolated Indigenous Peoples (OPI), and the Pará Society for the Defense of Human Rights (SDDH). Read more.

Black woman. The rejection of Jorge Messias's name, who had been nominated by Lula for a seat on the Supreme Court, opened the way for the president to heed the demand from civil society for the nomination of a Black woman to the position. One of the groups at the forefront of this movement is Mulheres Negras Decidem (Black Women Decide), which argues that the nomination of a Black woman to the position “is not a symbolic gesture. It is a political response. It is the justice that Brazil needs. It is the real possibility of redefining the future.” Read more.

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Feature Article

The Implications of the Lula-Trump Meeting on Brazilian Domestic Politics in an Election Year

By Guilherme Casarões*

Amid the presidential race and in the wake of bitter defeats in his relationship with Congress, President Lula da Silva set aside a few days in his agenda as president and pre-candidate for re-election to meet with Donald Trump in Washington on Thursday, May 7th.

Unlike the numerous international trips Lula has undertaken throughout his term, the meeting with Trump is less about international relations and more about the electoral landscape that has been unfolding in recent months.

At first glance, this is unusual. For decades, a maxim has dominated the analysis of Brazilian elections: foreign policy doesn't win votes. In fact, geopolitical or commercial agendas rarely excite the broader electorate. However, something began to change in the 2018 elections, when Jair Bolsonaro, presenting himself as anti-PT (Workers' Party) and anti-establishment, began to mobilize foreign references as campaign slogans.

"If the PT wins, Brazil will become Venezuela" was a powerful idea, albeit fallacious, that sought to associate the Brazilian left with Venezuelan authoritarianism, which at that time was already responsible for a humanitarian, economic, and political crisis on the other side of the border.

Bolsonarism didn't stop there. He promised Evangelical and Jewish voters the transfer of the Brazilian embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. More than that, the movement built its identity on an existential association with the President of the United States, Donald Trump, then in his first term.

Pretending to be the "Trump of the tropics," Bolsonaro promised a radical political shift if elected. And if he didn't achieve it in his four years in office, it wasn't for lack of effort, but due to a mix of widespread incompetence and social and institutional resistance.

Eight years later, history repeats itself. Jair Bolsonaro is ineligible and imprisoned, but his eldest son, Flávio, is in full campaign mode around the world. In just a few months, he visited El Salvador, Israel, Bahrain, France, and went to the United States at least three times – obvious destinations for someone openly seeking to consolidate a broad transnational far-right alliance.

During one of his trips to the United States, the senator participated in the traditional Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), one of the main events linked to the Trumpist movement. On that occasion, he promised, if elected, to replicate his father's government, both in its conservative agendas and in its submission to U.S. interests.
 The motto of Flávio's pre-campaign is very simple: only a Bolsonaro can cooperate with Donald Trump's White House, and only cooperation with the United States can generate prosperity for Brazil in the long term.

Lula's trip to Washington would put this narrative to the test. On the one hand, there was a declared “chemistry” between Trump and the Workers' Party leader since their meeting at the United Nations last September. On the other hand, bilateral tensions were far from being entirely overcome: even after the United States backed down on tariffs and sanctions against Brazilian officials, disagreements remain regarding trade, financial, and security issues.

By meeting with Trump for three hours behind closed doors, Lula dismantled the Bolsonaro narrative – at least for now. The absence of the press, at the request of the Brazilian delegation, allowed the conversation to be conducted without the risks of public embarrassment or misleading signals.

The result, reported by Trump in a social media post and discussed at length by Lula and his ministers in a subsequent press conference, was positive. Brazil and the United States did not reach any concrete agreement, but signaled a mutual desire for more cooperation and for addressing disputes through diplomatic channels.

Lula's foreign policy had already proven its resilience throughout last year in the context of numerous attacks from the White House against the Brazilian economy and democracy. It also reveals that the current Brazilian government is capable of fostering a constructive relationship with the Trump administration.

It also became evident that Lula's pragmatic and universalist global strategy does not prevent Brazil from maintaining simultaneous partnerships with the United States, China, the BRICS, and the European Union.

But the most important result concerns the electoral scenario, which today shows a virtual tie between Lula and his main rival. Besides neutralizing the narrative of Bolsonaro's foreign policy, the meeting in Washington touches on central domestic issues for the presidential race.

By reaffirming the importance of bilateral trade and rejecting tariffs, Lula and his team sent signals to relevant sectors of agribusiness and the business community that depend on the US market.
 By encouraging bilateral cooperation in the fight against organized crime, the Brazilian government demonstrates that it is in tune with the public security agenda, treated by voters as an absolute priority and frequently portrayed by Bolsonaro's supporters as if it were an issue exclusive to the right.

 By proposing the opening of the Brazilian market to more American investments, including in the field of critical minerals, Lula demonstrates that it is possible to cooperate on strategic issues without relinquishing sovereignty.

Although a meeting of this nature is unlikely to be enough to change the course of the October elections, Lula has taken an important step. In a political context where domestic and foreign policy are intertwined, this demonstration of diplomatic pragmatism goes hand in hand with the government's ability to handle difficult domestic agendas.

To the centrist voter, who will still have a few months to evaluate the presidential candidates, the message is clear: defending sovereignty pays off and is more efficient, from any perspective, than vows of ideological submission to foreign interests.

*Guilherme Casarões is an Associate Professor of Brazilian Studies at Florida International University. He is Coordinator of the Observatory of the Far Right (OED) and a WBO fellow.

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.