Feb 27 2026| Nº. 194

Editorial

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva capped off an eight-day diplomatic tour across Asia this week, returning to Brasília early on Wednesday, February 25. His visit to New Delhi from February 19 to 22, which included participation in the IA Impact Summit and high-level meetings with Indian counterparts, underscored a push for deeper technological and commercial cooperation. Brazil does relatively little business with India compared to its robust trade portfolio with the United States and China. Deepening commercial ties with India is yet another hedge for a Brazilian government eager to diversify its export markets in an era of increasing geopolitical competition. In Seoul, Lula and President Lee Jae Myung agreed to elevate bilateral ties to a strategic partnership, advancing cooperation in areas ranging from critical minerals to the digital economy. The trip concluded with brief meeting in Abu Dhabi with Emir Mohammed bin Zayed to discuss a potential MERCOSUL trade pact, reinforcing a deliberate effort to diversify Brazil’s external partnerships amid intensifying geopolitical friction between the United States and China.

In what is sure to be a heated election year, Lula has used the global stage to showcase a foreign policy vision rooted in strategic autonomy, and South-South cooperation. The choreography of high-level meetings in Asia was as much about domestic signaling as diplomatic substance, projecting statesmanship and experience at a moment when voters are reassessing Brazil’s direction. Fresh polling on Wednesday, February 25 for the first time showed Lula statistically tied with Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the likely candidate of the far right, in a hypothetical second-round contest this October, underscoring how narrow the electoral terrain has become. While the president retains institutional advantages and a broad coalition, the data suggest that polarization remains entrenched and that the Bolsonaro political brand, still closely associated with former president Jair Bolsonaro, continues to command a durable national constituency.

Against this backdrop, the country received a long-awaited measure of judicial closure. On Wednesday, February 25, Brazil’s Supreme Court convicted four men — including two politicians and two former police officials — for the 2018 assassination of Rio de Janeiro councilwoman Marielle Franco and her driver, Anderson Gomes. The unanimous ruling, overseen by Justice Alexandre de Moraes, represents a watershed in a case that became a national and international symbol of elite impunity and the dangers faced by Black, LGBTQ, and anti-corruption activists. For years, “Who killed Marielle?” echoed across protests and public walls. The convictions mark a rare instance of accountability at the highest levels. In a nation still grappling with democratic fragility, that long-delayed outcome carries weight well beyond the courtroom.

Highlights

• Supreme Court Questioned. The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court has been under intense scrutiny since the beginning of this year. The reason is the widespread perception that the 11 justices of the Court, as well as other members of the Brazilian judiciary, are favored by a series of economic privileges stemming from their positions. These so-called "perks" are financial gains attached to judges' salaries as compensation and benefits, which end up reaching millions of dollars. Furthermore, some Supreme Court justices face suspicion for owning companies or having family members who provide services to clients whose interests intersect with cases being judged by the Court. The questioning opens a crack in the image of an institution that has already been attacked by the far right since it condemned those involved in the failed coup d'état of January 8, 2023.

• Breach of secrecy. In the most dramatic chapter of this crisis of confidence, the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry investigating organized crime in Brazil requested this week the lifting of bank secrecy for a company whose partners include Dias Toffoli, a Supreme Court justice appointed to the position by Lula in 2009. Toffoli is a partner in Maridt Participações, a company that received payment from one of the funds linked to Master – a bank that became the pivot of the biggest credibility crisis in the sector in recent years. The owners of Master are in prison awaiting sentencing. Toffoli had been appointed rapporteur of the case and took a series of atypical measures, including the decree of secrecy over the process. Subsequently, his connection with companies cited in the scandal was discovered. The case opens another front of wear and tear for a Supreme Court already under pressure. 

• Heavy rains and deaths. The heavy rains that fell this week in southeastern Brazil caused the death of nearly 50 people and left more than 20 missing. The state most affected was Minas Gerais, where there were landslides, road closures, and overflowing rivers. In one city alone, Juiz de Fora, the number of homeless reached 3,500. The tragedy occurs just two years after a similar, albeit larger, disaster in the state of Rio Grande do Sul in 2024, when 146 people died. Although heavy rains are common in much of Brazil at this time of year, these events have been occurring with increasing force, posing new challenges to local governments. The NGO Ação da Cidadania launched a major fundraising campaign for the victims of the disaster in Minas Gerais. Click here to donate.

2026 Election Observatory

Scandal. The press this week caught an embarrassing handwritten note by presidential pre-candidate Flávio Bolsonaro on a document he used during a meeting with leaders of his far-right party, the Liberal Party (PL). The son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who is now Lula's main opponent in the October election, wrote next to the name of one of his party's candidates: "asked for R$ 15,000 not to be a candidate." The information refers to the decision of current federal deputy Marcos Pollon regarding whether to run for a Senate seat or for governor of the state. Pollon denies asking for a bribe, but the case has highlighted the obscure ways in which some parties make their decisions.

Bolsonaro Family. In the same week, another son of Jair Bolsonaro, former federal deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, who has lived in the United States since March 2025, said he intends to run for a Senate seat in the October elections, even while outside of Brazil. Although his term as a congressman was revoked for exceeding the allowed number of absences, Eduardo did not lose his political rights and can still run for office. The decision still needs to be submitted to his father Jair Bolsonaro, who, even while in jail, remains the leader of the clan, and to the current governor of São Paulo, Tarciso de Freitas, an ally of Bolsonaro in the country’s most important state.

News from ABO and social organizations and movements:

Event at Columbia. James N. Green, president of the WBO Board of Directors, will give a lecture at Columbia University on March 5th entitled “Academics and Activists: The International Defense of Brazilian Democracy and the 2026 Presidential Elections”. The event will take place at 12:15 pm in the common room on the 2nd floor of the Heyman Center at Columbia University. For more information and to register for the event, which is free and open to the public, click here.

Cerrado and Caatinga. The number of alerts issued by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) regarding deforestation in the Brazilian Cerrado biome between August 2025 and January 2026 was 6% lower than in the same period of the previous year. Despite the reduction, this remains one of the main threatened areas of native vegetation conversion in the country. Analyses by the Climate Observatory and the Socio-Environmental Institute indicate continued pressure on traditional territories and strategic water recharge areas. The Pastoral Land Commission also records conflicts over land and water in the region. Studies show that accumulated deforestation is already compromising the water system, increasing floods during the rainy season and reducing water availability during the dry season. The project "Cerrado – The Sacred Link of Brazil's Waters" points to a loss equivalent to 30 Olympic swimming pools per minute since the 1970s and a 27% drop in the minimum safe flow.

UN. The Brazilian State presented an unprecedented initiative to include the homeless population on the international human rights agenda during the opening of the 61st session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. The initiative, undertaken during the session from February 23 to April 4, positions this as a structural issue linked to inequality and racism. In its opening speech, the Brazilian delegation highlighted democracy, socio-environmental justice, and the fight against hate speech, in addition to announcing the renewal of the country's candidacy for the Council for the 2027-2029 term.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared the Brazilian State internationally responsible in the case of Cley Mendes and others (Tapanã Massacre) vs. Brazil for extrajudicial executions and the lack of a swift, independent, and effective investigation. The ruling recognized violations of the rights to life, personal integrity, judicial guarantees, and judicial protection, under the terms of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as pointing to the use of racial stereotypes in the criminal process. The decision is particularly relevant in the current context, marked by high rates of police lethality and structural deficits in the justice system. The Court also determined full reparations to the victims, measures to prevent repetition, and mandatory training of justice system agents with a racial perspective, directly impacting public security policies, combating structural discrimination and strengthening access to justice.

Defense of democracy. The New Paradigms Institute celebrated its tenth anniversary in February, marking ten years of work defending democracy, fundamental rights, and transparency in public administration. To commemorate the date, several prominent figures recorded videos highlighting important aspects of this history. Paulo Abrão, executive director of WBO, emphasized the "non-negotiable commitment to democracy" that marks the institution's history. See the testimonials on New Paradigms' social media.

Feature Article

Mercosur and the European Union: Society, Trade, and Democracy

By Paulo Lugon Arantes*

The societies of two socioeconomic blocs, the European Union and Mercosur, are in the ratification phase of the world's largest agreement. The problem is that few people know that it is not just an agreement for the progressive reduction of taxes by up to 91%, as reported in the media. The Agreement is comprehensive, made up of three pillars: political dialogue, trade, and sustainable development.

The trade pillar obviously had a more intricate negotiation, while the other two – political dialogue and sustainable development – ​​had already been discussed since 1995, starting with the Framework Agreement signed in Madrid. Regarding trade, the members of the European Union ended up relinquishing their national sovereignty in favor of the European Commission, which assumed the responsibility of negotiating matters related to this sector. It was this detachment of the commercial part of the agreement that ended up attracting most of the press's interest and, consequently, newspaper headlines. The pursuit of fairer trade – at least in theory – accelerated the signing of the Agreement, which was negotiated with alternating low and high pressure over two decades. In 2021, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stated, during a visit to Brussels, that he was interested in concluding this agreement. Ultimately, environmental, political, and technical obstacles cooled this discussion for years until Trump's tariff hikes and the American president's notorious disdain for multilateralism finally catalyzed the progress towards the adoption of the document.

Considering this is primarily an agreement between two societies, including trade, some reflections are in order:

Both blocs have two renowned regional human rights systems, where all countries within the blocs have submitted to the jurisdiction of their respective courts. On the European side, membership in the trade bloc is conditional upon ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights with automatic jurisdiction of its Court, which stimulated the transition of several European countries to democracy from the 1980s onwards.

On the Mercosur side, the Inter-American Court has ruled on landmark cases such as Vladimir Herzog v. Brazil and Gelman v. Uruguay, producing a significant body of jurisprudence in matters of transitional justice. But we, in Mercosur and Europe, still have a long way to go to maintain the democratic achievements gained with great effort.

The expansion of the European far right, breaking through "protective barriers" in parliaments across the continent, resonates with homologous movements in Mercosur, some even with coup-mongering tendencies. It teaches us, Europeans and South Americans, that democracy is a daily construction of fundamental freedoms.

The EU-Mercosur Agreement plays a fundamental role in uniting parliamentarians and other political actors in the development of substantive, diverse and participatory democracy. Let the São Paulo Pride Parade protest against the ban on its Budapest counterpart!

The Agreement itself does not contain harsh human rights clauses; it only mentions sanctions in case of non-compliance with the ILO's Fundamental Conventions and international environmental treaties. The sustainable development pillar, the subject of a specific dispute settlement mechanism, does not foresee similar sanctions. Therefore, the Agreement will depend on ancillary sanction mechanisms.

In this sense, it is regrettable that, on both sides, environmental governance has been significantly weakened. Working against the restructuring of the Ministry of the Environment and the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), the Brazilian Congress has carried out an unprecedented dismantling of environmental protections since the country's redemocratization. In Argentina, the attack on the "Ley de Glaciares" (Glacier Law) is also worrying. In the North Atlantic, the European Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) and the Enterprise Directive (CS3D), which apply subsidiarily to the Agreement, have also suffered significant setbacks since 2023, leaving trade without strict environmental control.

The fairness of trade also depends on the added value of each side. Not without reason, Mercosur agribusiness, one of the big winners of the Agreement, has been criticized by Indigenous, quilombola (Afro-Brazilian), peasant, and traditional community leaders for exchanging commodities for high value-added products, perpetuating a colonial exchange relationship. Considering that over 70% of all real food comes from local farmers in both blocs, Mercosur soybeans largely become a component of ultra-processed foods for European tables, causing deforestation on one side and illness on the other. The end of the voluntary soybean moratorium in the Amazon and the advance of monoculture in the Cerrado further increase the pressure on these biomes. Obsolete pesticide formulas, banned in the EU, whose patents gain an economic lifeline through export, sicken and kill the population of the southern hemisphere, leading to UN condemnation in the Portillo Cáceres v. Paraguay case.

Beyond business as usual, the Agreement can and should play a fundamental and invigorating role in relations between the two societies, including, obviously, trade. A reciprocal flow, not only of capital, but also of people, ideas, and solidarity, is a promise to be fulfilled, giving value to the exports of each bloc. May commodities not be exported with indigenous blood on them, and may xenophobia cease to plague the South American diaspora community in Europe. Finally, may there be genuine dialogue between female parliamentarians from both blocs, valuing democracy, which has become an increasingly rare commodity in global trade.

*Paulo Lugon Arantes is a lawyer, an expert in international human rights protection, and coordinator of the Europe Brazil Office (EBO). He holds a bachelor's degree in legal sciences from the Federal University of Espírito Santo, UFES (1999); an LL.M. in International and European Human Rights Protection from Utrecht University (2003); and a doctorate focusing on racial discrimination from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (2019). He is currently a professor, consultant, and expert witness with extensive work in the UN human rights protection system.

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.