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Washington Brazil Office

Oct 10 2025| Nº. 177

Editorial

Brazil and the United States are stepping up their diplomatic interactions following a videoconference between the presidents of both countries on Monday, October 6. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and President Donald Trump described the conversation as amicable and productive and likely to lead to future conversations. On Thursday, October 9, Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira announced that he and Secretary of State Marco Rubio had agreed to meet in Washington in the coming weeks to discuss Washington’s trade war following Lula’s direct appeal for Trump to lift tariffs on key Brazilian exports. The move signals an attempt to recalibrate ties with Washington after a year of unusually sharp rhetoric, with Lula stressing that the bilateral agenda should focus on mutual growth and fair competition rather than threats of retaliation. Lula has framed the outreach, which began earlier this month when both leaders met briefly at the United Nations General Assembly, as a pivot toward pragmatism, insisting that he is willing to negotiate commercial matters on equal terms with any world leader but not at the expense of Brazilian sovereignty.  

Yet while Lula’s foreign ministry moves to improve relations abroad, his government suffered a sharp defeat at home. On Wednesday, October 8, the Chamber of Deputies voted to pull from its agenda a measure that sought to raise taxes on financial investments, online sports gambling, and other sectors to close a looming fiscal shortfall. The move erased a major plank of Finance Minister Fernando Haddad’s revenue strategy for the upcoming year. The government had argued that without the additional resources it would struggle to meet the 2026 fiscal target and maintain funding for social programs. But opposition lawmakers accused Lula of trying to sneak through new burdens on consumers and investors at a time of weak growth and high interest rates. The defeat highlights Lula’s fickle coalition in Congress, which has delivered some notable wins for the administration despite its lack of reliability.

Amid these challenges, Lula received good political news this week, with fresh polling showing him ahead in all tested first- and second-round scenarios by comfortable margins. In next year’s presidential race, Lula currently holds double-digit advantages over possible rivals from the Bolsonaro family and allies like São Paulo governor Tarcísio de Freitas. The data indicate a clear improvement in Lula’s standing from historic lows earlier this year, driven, among other factors, by his largely successful handling of Trump’s hostility and the fact that the opposition remains bitterly divided. Indeed, improving ties with Trump would serve as a potent reminder of Lula’s statesmanship heading into a decisive year. There is much still to be decided, but the momentum remains in Lula’s favor.

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Highlights

  • Truth and Justice. Relatives of more than one hundred victims of the crimes of the dictatorship (1964-1985) participated in a ceremony this Wednesday, October 8 to deliver corrected death certificates. These certificates now include the information that their relatives were violently killed by agents of the military regime. At the same ceremony, some certificates that had already been corrected years ago but still contained generic information were also ratified and now contain more precise data. One such case is that of the Rubens Paiva family, whose story is portrayed in the Oscar-winning film "I’m Still Here."

  • Impunity. Federal Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, who has lived in the United States since February 2025, won a partial victory in Brazil this week. The Chamber of Deputies' Ethics Committee is reviewing a lawsuit filed against him by two members of Lula's Workers' Party (PT). Both accuse Eduardo of using his position to encourage hostile US measures against Brazil. However, the rapporteur for the case, Federal Deputy Marcelo Freitas, an ally of Eduardo, voted against the impeachment of the president's son this week. Freitas' report still needs to be voted on by the Committee members. The case will only be submitted to a full Chamber vote if a majority of the Ethics Committee members vote to impeach Eduardo. The definitive removal of Eduardo's mandate requires at least 257 votes out of a possible 513.

  • Accountability. This same week, the Ethics Committee also reviewed the case of three far-right congressmen who participated in a riot on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies August. At the time, the Bolsonaro supporter group occupied the Chamber's Executive Board and prevented the resumption of proceedings. The Committee decided to institute proceedings against them. The next step is to select a rapporteur, who has 30 days to present a report for a vote by the other members. The penalty is temporary suspension from office. However, to be enforced, it requires approval by a simple majority of the 513 members of the Chamber.

  • Electoral movement. Two ministers in the Lula administration – Celso Sabino (Sports) and André Fufuca (Tourism) – announced this week that they will not resign. Their decision contradicts an order given by their parties: União Brasil and Partido Popular, respectively. Both right-wing parties were part of the current government's broad and diverse coalition but have formally broken with Lula. This movement is part of the plans for next year's national elections.

  • Workers’ income. One-third of Brazilian workers—35.3% of the total, or 31.3 million people—earned the minimum wage in 2022, equivalent to R$1,212 per month at the time. The data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) was collected in the most recent Demographic Census and released this Thursday. October 9. At the other extreme, 7.6% of workers earned more than five minimum wages, or R$6,060 per month. The national average for Brazilian workers was R$2,851 in 2022.

 

News from ABO and social organizations and movements:

New partnership. The WBO and the Lavoro Institute have begun a joint effort to internationalize the debate on labor and social rights. Over the course of 12 months, joint actions will be undertaken to expand the international reach of issues such as the growing informality and precariousness of the labor market, work on digital platforms, working hours, equal pay, union organizing, and respect for human rights standards in the world of work. Learn more.

World of work. The International Court of Justice held public hearings on the "right to strike" in international law from October 6th to 8th. This topic is central to the partnership between the Brazil Office and the Lavoro Institute. Learn more about the hearings and the partnership.

Journalism Award. The Vladimir Herzog Institute and partner organizations announced the winners of the 47th Vladimir Herzog Journalism Award for Amnesty and Human Rights. This year's edition features the special category "Defense of Democracy," created to consider the essential role of the press in preserving the democratic rule of law. See the winners.

People's Summit. More than 10,000 people from 1,000 organizations will participate in the People's Summit in Belém, Pará, from November 12th to 16th. This COP30 side event aims to give a voice to local communities, traditional peoples, and social movements building real solutions to the climate crisis. Learn more.

Just Transition. The Cipó Platform and the European Foundation for Progressive Studies (FEPS) will host a high-level debate on Just Transitions on October 15th in Brasília, at the Pre-COP30. The discussions will focus on the perspectives of the European Union and Brazil on just transition. Learn more.

Human Rights. The Brazilian Pro Tempore Presidency of MERCOSUR (PPTB), with the support of the Institute of Public Policies on Human Rights of MERCOSUR (IPPDH), calls on civil society organizations and social movements to participate in the meetings of the Commissions and Working Groups of the 45th Meeting of High Authorities on Human Rights of MERCOSUR (XLV RAADH), which will take place in person and/or virtually from October 8th to 23rd, 2025. Learn more.

 

Feature Article

International Migrants on the Far Right and the Transnationalization Fronts of Bolsonarism in the US

By Teresa Cristina Schneider Marques*

Trumpism and Bolsonarism comprise the so-called "neopatriotic far right," a political movement that, according to Sanahuja and Burian (2024), may have specificities in each country, but which shares a discourse of distrust in the electoral processes of liberal democracies. This "ideological synergy" has made the two countries a hub for transnational and international articulation of the Brazilian far right, according to Paulo Abrão (2024). Furthermore, the United States has the largest population of Brazilians living abroad—over 2 million—and became the foreign country where Bolsonaro achieved his largest extraterritorial electoral victory in 2022.

Bolsonaro's transnationalization strategy intensified in 2022, following the defeat in the Brazilian elections and the failed attack on the headquarters of national political institutions on January 8, 2023. These harsh defeats for Bolsonarism led to a decrease in the resources available for Bolsonarism's political action at home. When this occurs, actors tend to seek transnational projection of their causes, aiming for a "boomerang" effect identified by Keck and Sikkink (1998), that is, they hope that their demands, after being welcomed abroad, will return stronger to their home country.

Trump's election in 2024 strengthened the global right, opening new opportunities for Bolsonarism, especially as a result of the "domestication" of its cause in the United States. According to Tarrow and Della Porta (2005), this process of transnationalization involves efforts to have the cause "adopted" by a second country. In doing so, Brazilians hope that these American partners will intervene directly in their home country to support their demands, thus completing the "boomerang effect." This possibility becomes even stronger in a country like the United States, given its geopolitical, military, and economic importance.

Aiming to promote the "adoption" of Bolsonarism not only by U.S. political institutions but also by economic, social, and cultural forces, three fronts of Bolsonarist action are becoming increasingly evident. First, political institutions and parties stand out. As rightly pointed out by Casarões and Belém López (2025), Bolsonarism has implemented a series of actions in this regard. Transnational partisan connections and the international circulation of members of the pro-Bolsonaro political elite through lobbying and other practices are a structuring part of the efforts to promote the "adoption" of the Bolsonarist cause by the United States.

There has also been an investment in U.S. public opinion. As João Batista Júnior, a reporter for Piauí magazine, discovered, Eduardo Bolsonaro has spent much of his time being interviewed by all types of media outlets—from television to podcasts on online platforms. The space provided by local media—including small and rural media outlets—and liberal think tanks and institutes is important for winning over U.S. public opinion and thus securing the necessary support for Trumpist measures targeting Brazil.

Finally, although it receives less academic attention, the research we conducted within the Observatory of Transnational Collective Action and Comparative Politics (OAPoc) found that Bolsonarism has also directed part of its efforts toward mobilizing the Brazilian community living in the United States. This population has the potential to support the first two fronts, given their linguistic attributes and their integration into personal networks that allow them to leverage diverse resources, both in their country of origin and in their country of residence. Thus, international migrants can contribute to the transnationalization of political forces by performing various tasks essential to this process: building alliances; translating narratives into a specific cultural and linguistic context; mobilizing and distributing financial, organizational, symbolic, and cultural resources; projecting and amplifying actors and ideas, etc.

The Brazilian community has become the third front of Bolsonarism's action in the United States, demonstrating the need to abandon any homogenizing or normative perspective on the migrants. Several actions have been undertaken to increase the motivation and engagement of this population, and also to mitigate any costs that could arise from this group's political action.

Several pro-Bolsonaro activists who migrated to the United States—notably blogger Allan Santos, the former Jovem Pan commentator; journalist Paulo Figueiredo; and Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro—seek to establish strong relationships with these communities, encouraging their members' engagement and participating in the organization of events and protests, using their own social media channels as one of their tools. Of note is their contact with supporter groups such as "Yes Brasil," based in Florida, and a Brazilian group from Massachusetts that is leading the organization of the "Brazilian conservative Congress in the United States," an event held annually since 2022.

Pro-Bolsonaro actors  residing in Brazil are also driving this movement. The 2022 motorcycle rally in Orlando which was attended by Jair Bolsonaro himself and the allocation of R$127,000—an amount calculated only through 2023—for the participation of right-wing congressmen in conservative events organized by migrant communities, especially in the United States, as verified by Scofield for Agência Pública (2023), clearly demonstrate that Bolsonaristas have identified the potential of this population for their transnationalization project. Such actions strengthen nationalist sentiment and integrate these communities through a shared political identity anchored in conservative values.

Therefore, Bolsonarism's transnationalization strategy is well-structured and designed on multiple scales. In the United States, it encompasses everything from U.S. institutions and political parties to the Brazilian migrant community. This case highlights that, if we want to understand the transnationalization of this Brazilian right wing, which has recently gained greater media attention with the so-called "tariff hike" imposed by Donald Trump, it is also necessary to look at the microlevel and the actions of invisible actors, such as migrants.

*Teresa Cristina Schneider Marques holds a PhD in Political Science and is a CNPq productivity fellow. She teaches undergraduate courses in International Relations and the graduate program in Sociology and Political Science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS).

 

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.

 
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