Editorial

Reclaiming National Colors

Brazil’s victory over Serbia in its World Cup opener was a rare moment of celebration for many Brazilians across the political spectrum. In recent years, the yellow jersey of the national soccer team has been claimed by right-wing protestors with many on the left refusing to wear the shirt for its political connotations. Many of the team’s most prominent players endorsed the outgoing incumbent Jair Bolsonaro. Notably, however, Richarlison, the star of the first match, did not. Twenty years after its last World Cup championship, Brazil seems poised for success, and millions of Brazilians are as invested as ever in the outcome of the world’s most-watched sporting event. But some have refused to put their politics on hold. Journalist Felipe de Souza, for example, reported on groups of die-hard Bolsonaro supporters who ignored the game as it was happening in order to maintain their vigil outside of army barracks where they are calling for a military intervention. "We like soccer,” one of the demonstrators told the journalist, “we like the national team. But the Cup happens every four years, and right now we prefer to help Brazil.” Over three weeks since Lula defeated Bolsonaro at the polls, a small number of the incumbent’s supporters remain in the streets urging the armed forces to undo the result of a democratic election. Momentum does not seem on their side.

President-elect Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s inauguration is rapidly approaching and the goings-on of his transition team remain the most watched news stories in the country. Lula predicted after the game that Brazil would win the World Cup, an outcome that could work to his advantage. During the military dictatorship, the generals in power sought to coopt the national team to shore up its bases of popular support. In 1994 and 2002 when Brazil won, the country was undergoing moments of economic and political transition respectively, with the joy around victory serving to ease some of the tension in the body politic. Expectations are high for the incoming Lula administration. Success for Brazil at the World Cup would undoubtedly bode well for the country’s self-esteem and international standing. It would showcase in a very real sense that good times are here again for Brazil. Before then, however, there are many challenges to be faced. 

The first has to do with policy. Lula’s transition team has been negotiating the contours of a deal that would allow the incoming administration some flexibility in budgetary matters to keep campaign promises, including an extension of the R$600 (approx. US$120) welfare payments to the neediest Brazilians. Part of the impasse with Congress is, reportedly, the fact that Lula has yet to name his finance minister. Doing so would help make clear which path a new Lula administration might take on economic matters. The fact that there is no clear pick so far has added to the anxieties of investors and politicians concerned about Lula’s victory. The second major issue defining this transition period is Bolsonaro’s tacit encouragement of anti-democratic acts against Lula’s election. There are reports that Lula’s transition team is refusing to work with certain security agencies because of their close association to strong Bolsonaro supporters and the president himself has only reluctantly called on supporters to accept the results of the vote. This foot-dragging is very unlikely to keep Lula from being sworn in, but it does contribute to the profound polarization that has defined Brazilian politics in recent years. As Lula insisted throughout the campaign, there is nothing inherently wrong with polarization. Every democratic country has its own political fault lines The problem, however, is that Bolsonaro is stimulating polarization between him and democracy itself.

Highlights

• BOLSONARO AND THE PUBLIC ETHICS. On his way out of the presidency, Jair Bolsonaro appointed two political allies to the Public Ethics Commission for a three-year term. Minister Célio Faria Júnior (Secretary of Government) and special advisor João Henrique Nascimento de Freitas will serve as members of the seven-member commission linked to the Office of the President of the Republic. The Commission, ironically, will directly assist President-elect Lula in assessing potential conflict of interest and conduct in disagreement with the norms of the Code of Conduct of the Federal Administration.

• TRANSITION WITHOUT RUPTURE IN AGRIBUSINESS. President-elect Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's guidelines for his government to support sustainable agribusiness do not foresee immediate drastic changes in the course of government policies. However, according to Joe Valle (Democratic Labor Party), a forest engineer and transition team member, "Our commitment is to remove sustainability from a marginal business practice. Agro grows when we work together with environmental issues."

• FIRST BRAZILIAN LEADING THE INTER AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. Elected president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Brazilian economist Ilan Goldfajn said in a November 20 interview with TV Globo and GloboNews that the relationship with the newly elected government will be of "total harmony".

• BOLSONARO AND THE VANISHING VACCINATION DATA. The Federal Audit Court of (TCU) sent a strong warning about the Bolsonaro government attack on the Brazilian Public Health System (SUS) to the presidential transition team. The precariousness of databases documenting Covid-19 vaccination coverage led the TCU declare that it was impossible to assess compliance with immunization goals. The lack of information can affect the planning of health policies due to the high number of potential cases. Bolsonaro's government repeatedly underestimated the impact of pandemic and undermined SUS efforts to respond to the Covid-19 emergency.

• IN DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY. The Transition Team of the elected government is studying policy proposals to combat anti-democratic acts that aim to overturn elections and attack Brazilian democratic institutions. The plan includes changing legislation, canceling executive orders signed by President Jair Bolsonaro, and improving dialogue with the judiciary. Those responsible for the thematic group, Justice and Security, have already created a specific subgroup to deal with the theme "Crimes against the Democratic Rule of Law."

• ELECTORAL COURT REJECTS COMPLAIN. On November 23, Alexandre de Moraes, the Chief Justice of Brazil's electoral court (TSE), rejected a complaint from President Jair Bolsonaro's Liberal Party (to overturn the presidential election. According to court documents, the petition to annul ballots from this year's presidential vote stated that many machines had malfunctioned. The Court decision calls Bolsonaro's party's initiative "ludicrous and illicit" and "ostensibly conspiratorial toward the democratic rule of law." The court condemned the party leaders to pay a fine of more than 22 million reais (around US$ 4.3 million dollars).

Feature Article

Social Media Democratization: A New Leadership Role for Brazil on the Global Scale?

by Marianna Poyares

In his speech after his victory, President-elect Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, while addressing several issues concerning the country's domestic agenda, made a promising announcement regarding the country's return as a significant player in the international arena. "Brazil is back," he said while mentioning strategies ranging from the reactivation of regional and cross-regional alliances, such as the Mercosul, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac), and the BRICS, the return to a pragmatic international affairs agenda, exemplified in his nudge towards Mercosul-EU agreement negotiations. Furthermore, President-elect Lula underscored Brazil's new role in multilateral governance as a leader in environmental protection, indigenous rights, and a green economy. Though not unexpected, the focus on these areas is a relief due to the systematic attacks and severe institutional dismantling and cooptation they suffered during Bolsonaro's government. 

However, I would like to call attention to another area of interest, announced in the same speech under the guise of addressing domestic policy, but that has an immense potential of becoming another avenue for Brazil's projection as a central player in the global arena: social media regulation. Hiding behind a facade of free speech, social media companies have avoided structural regulations in a number of countries. Presenting themselves as the public squares of our times, platforms such as Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, and Facebook have become the largest channels for widespread misinformation, systematic conspiracy theory production and reproduction, and ultimately for the growth of right-wing extremism around the globe. Conspiracy theories recently turned extremist groups, such as the QAnon, Le Grand Remplacement (The Great Replacement), or regional fake news, such as the erotic baby bottles during Brazil's 2018 elections, entirely dependent on social media for their popularity. 

Even if such platforms present themselves as a neutral space where ideas freely circulate and, therefore, the rise of the far right globally is merely the unavoidable outcome of the expansion of unmediated social debate, we know this is not the case. Social media is far from an unregulated public square. On the contrary, they are highly manicured enclosures, shaped by algorithms that target and shape behavior and engagement, in order to generate profit. The fact is that social media is already regulated in the sense that specific designs shape these platforms. The question is not whether social media should be regulated, but who gets to have a voice in deciding what this regulation looks like.

Brazil has one of the most progressive legislations on the internet and user data protection worldwide. The Marco Civil da Internet (Civilian Framework of the Internet), produced in 2014 and notably amongst its addendums, the Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados Pessoais (General Law for the Protection of Personal Date), consist of an extraordinary legal framework, setting up foundational principles for internet use, as well as a comprehensive list of users' rights and guarantees.

Despite the Marco's welcome and timely contribution to internet regulation, its exclusive focus on individual rights (such as the right to privacy and freedom of speech) targets some but not all the dangers to democracy. For instance, companies such as Meta and Google have been increasingly regulating hate speech and fake news content. The control–both automated and through user input and subsequent analysis–though timid, has been sufficiently disturbing to generate a flow of users to other platforms, such as Telegram, MeWe, Gab, and Rumble. 

Although content regulation has been essential for avoiding, for instance, the radicalization of so-called "echo chambers," it has been utterly ineffective in opening them up precisely because the algorithm that informs content visibility functions as an echo chamber in order to stimulate user interaction and consumption.

In addition, the ability of such platforms to spread any narrative in the form of a purchased advertisement without much accountability remains unchecked. As an example, President Jair Bolsonaro, in the last days of his 2022 presidential campaign, spent in one single day 4.5 million Brazilian reais (approximately US$850,000) on YouTube advertisements. The videos did not clearly present themselves as advertisements and disseminated several lies against now President-elect Lula. 

A true democratization of social media would require, on the one hand, leveraging technology and resources that require public-private partnerships, the creation of legislation, including criminal legislation, and infrastructure for monitoring extremist content while, on the other, upholding the user's right to privacy. These two instances need not be antithetical. In fact, they can be complimentary if we look at the limitations imposed on internet conglomerates in storing personal and private data from users. Also, the encryption in individual user interaction is itself not problematic. What is worrisome is the artificial creation and growth of antidemocratic hate communities. 

In addition to user-generated content regulation, it is imperative to regulate and legislate on the distribution of paid content by these platforms, as well as on unpaid automated mass-messaging (such as in the case of mass messaging through WhatsApp). Brazil's Marco provides a terrific baseline for both. An expanded, revised, and renewed Marco would work toward safeguarding the fundamental right to privacy while transforming the internet into a more democratic space. As one of the world's largest and most progressive democracies, recently captured by social media-fueled right-wing extremism, Brazil now has the challenge, and the unique opportunity, of becoming a global leader in the democratization and regularization of social media. Hopefully this opportunity will not be overlooked.

Marianna Poyares is a Research Fellow at the Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility, in New York City. Her research centers around new technologies of surveillance and mobility control, immigration enforcement, Human Rights and hemispheric migration. 

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.