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Washington Brazil Office

Apr 19 2024 | Nº. 113

Editorial

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva traveled to Colombia this week to meet with Colombian President Gustavo Petro. The meeting aimed to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries and foster collaboration on several regional and global issues. As some specialists speculated, both leaders share a concern over the “bukelization” of hemispheric governments, a reference to the unconstitutional hardline against crime taken by Salvadoran president Nayib Bukele. Among other issues, they discussed the political situation in Venezuela, with Colombia calling for “a democratic pact between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition”, according to Bloomberg, “to ensure that the loser of the upcoming presidential election is shielded from any type of political persecution.” Brazil has backed the suggestion, but it is unclear how Maduro will respond. Brazil and Colombia are two of Venezuela’s closest partners. Their increasingly willingness to criticize Maduro has signaled a more substantial shift is possible in the months ahead.

Another foreign policy challenge emerged this week with Iran’s assault on Israel using hundreds of missiles and drones. The attack was in retaliation for an Israeli strike on an Iranian consulate in Damascus earlier this month that killed seven officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign ministry, put out a statement upon early reports of the assault. Some complained that it did not do enough to criticize Iran, but the statement’s opening sentence clearly attributed blame to the Islamic republic by noting that “the Brazilian government is following, with serious concern, reports of Iran sending drones and missiles towards Israel, leaving neighboring countries such as Jordan and Syria on alert.” Nevertheless, the Lula government has sought to maintain its tradition of balance on this issue, as with so many others. Whether this is tenable in the medium term, of course, is an open question. 

The opposition is also making moves against the Lula administration and other governmental institutions, coordinating increasingly with Republicans in the United States. On Wednesday, April 17, the House Judiciary Committee released a report entitled "The Attack on Free Speech Abroad and the Biden Administration's Silence: The Case of Brazil" purportedly revealing a censorship regime in Latin America’s largest nation. In cooperation with Elon Musk, the report noted that “the Committee issued a subpoena to X Corp. for documents and records relating to recent efforts by the Superior Electoral Court and the Supreme Federal Court in Brazil to compel X to censor social-media accounts in the country.” This new offensive from congressional Republicans indicates a degree of coordination with far-right forces in Brazil and tech platforms that should alarm anyone concerned with democracy and the rule of law.

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Highlights

  • REACTION FROM THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT. One day after the Judiciary Committee of the US House of Representatives published a document on Brazil, the Brazilian Supreme Court reacted through a note in which it clarified that the orders made public by the U.S. congressional committee “are not decisions based on the determination of the removal of content or profiles, but rather of the letters sent to the platforms to comply with the decision." The Brazilian Supreme Court also said that "making a comparison for everyone to understand, it is as if they had published the arrest warrant (and not the decision that was the basis for the arrest) or the letter to comply with the blocking of an account (and not the decision that was the basis for blocking it)." The Supreme Court's note is a response to the accusation that its orders to remove content from the air on X do not present grounds for that decision.

     

  • TENSION WITH CONGRESS. Brazilian domestic politics has been characterized in recent days by an increase in friction involving the Congress with an opposition majority and the two other branches of the government: the executive, which is overseen by Lula, and the judiciary, which has become the main force to contain to the overt coup attempt by the far right linked to Jair Bolsonaro.

     

  • CONGRESS X EXECUTIVE. The friction with the executive was manifested in direct and aggressive criticism made by Arthur Lira, the president of the Chamber of Deputies (Brazil’s lower house), to Alexandre Padilha, Lula's Minister of Institutional Relations. Lira said he had a “personal disaffection” with Padilha, whom he accused of being “incompetent.” According to the president of the Chamber, the fight occurred because Lula's minister spread false news to the press about Lira's position in the vote that culminated in the revocation of the mandate of Chiquinho Brazão, suspected of being one of the masterminds behind the murder of city councilor Marielle Franco. Right-wing parliamentarians tried to prevent the revocation of Brazão's mandate, arguing that the Brazil Supreme Court, which ordered Brazão's arrest, trampled on the powers of the legislature.

     

  • CONGRESS X JUDICIARY. The criticism in Brazão's case is just one of those that puts Congress and the Supreme Court on a collision course. On another front, the Senate approved a change in the law on drug use in Brazil. For the senators, anyone who possesses any quantity of any drug must be arrested. The Supreme Court has been discussing the decriminalization of marijuana possession. The judiciary's decision has not yet been issued, but there is a risk that the two interpretations will clash, worsening the differences between the two branches of government. Furthermore, senators threaten to collect signatures to approve the opening of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) to investigate abuses of the judiciary.

     

  • LAVA JATO (CAR WASH) OPERATION. The National Council of Justice, which functions as a type of regulatory body for the Judiciary in Brazil, began to rule on the case of federal judge Gabriela Hardt, who replaced Sergio Moro at the head of Lava Jato (Car Wash) Operation, after he left the position to take over Bolsonaro's Ministry of Justice. Initially, CNJ Judge Luis Felipe Salomão decided to remove Hardt based on an authorization given in 2019 that amounts paid by Petrobras within the scope of Lava Jato to the U.S. justice system would be directed to a fund linked to a private law institution in Brazil, under the pretext that this institution would fight corruption in the country. The agreement was worth US$853 million, of which 80% would come to Brazil. Half of this amount would be used to reimburse the State and the other half would go to the fund. Salomão's decision was, however, reviewed by the entire CNJ bench, which is only expected to make a definitive decision on Hardt's future when the trial of the judge resumes in May.

 


NEWS FROM WBO, ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:

  • BRAZIL-USA BICENTENNIAL. On April 22, 2024, the WBO and George Washington University will promote the event “Tightening Ties: A Reflection on 200 Years of Brazil-US Relations” with the participation of U.S. and Brazilian diplomats and researchers. The event will be at the Elliott School of International Relations in Washington. Registration can be done in advance via the link for in-person participation, as there will be no online transmission.

  • BIG TECH. In response to the document on freedom of expression and the Brazilian Judiciary prepared by the Judiciary Committee of the US House of Representatives on Wednesday, April 17, the WBO published a note in which it refutes arguments made by Republican congressional members leading the initiative. To guide the debate, the WBO offered explanations about the context of the fight by the State and Brazilian society against disinformation and an attempted coup in a series of explanations made by experts associated with the organization.

  • BLACK MOVEMENTS. A group of Black Brazilian women's organizations affiliated with the Washington Brazil Office published an open letter criticizing the oral statement of the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the UN in Geneva during the 3rd Forum on People of African Descent. The letter demands a series of reparations, such as the creation of memory centers, inclusion in the Portuguese school curriculum of the harmful impacts of colonialism, encouragement of other European countries to adopt reparatory and other effective measures to combat xenophobia and racism. The organizations were advised by the WBO during their participation in the Forum, which expressed its solidarity with the letter.

  • SOCIAL MEDIA. The Rights on the Network Coalition, made up of more than 50 organizations, will hold a symposium entitled “Regulation of digital platforms – The Urgency of an Essential Agenda for Democracy” on April 23 in the Chamber of Deputies in Brasília. The idea is to debate Bill 2630, authored by Senator Alessandro Vieira, which establishes the Brazilian Law on Freedom, Responsibility and Transparency on the Internet in Brazil.

  • JUDICIAL HARASSMENT. Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism (ABRAJI) will launch its “Monitoring of Judicial Harassment against Journalists” next Wednesday, April 24. The event will take place at the University of São Paulo Law School. The work, carried out with the support of UNESCO, offers a means of monitoring abusive legal actions that weaken the rights to freedom of the press and access to information of public interest in Brazil.

  • INTERNET SECURITY. The InternetLab will receive applications from people interested in the current debate on internet security, content moderation and artificial intelligence, topics on which the InternetLab School focuses. The applications are due by April 21. The target audience is professionals from all sectors who work with public policies in the sector. The course will take place in June.

 

Feature Article

Haiti: 20 Years and the Same Mistakes. What is Brazil's Role?

By Neno Garbers*

Brazil led the military component of United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) for 13 years. Around US$ 1 billion (R$ 5 billion) annually was spent on this mission, which involved 36 countries and a very expensive structure, with work concentrated on the military aspect, which included the promotion of disarmament of the population, the dismantling of armed groups and gangs, and the restructuring and training of the Haiti National Police – objectives that, in my view, Haiti itself could have achieved.

Now, seven years after the end of MINUSTAH, there is once again talk of establishing a new foreign mission in Haiti. But first, we have to ask ourselves: how was it possible that a mission, with so many international agents, supported political groups linked to the USA, who use gangs to stay in power, bypassing a series of important, respected political agents with a history of democracy in Haiti?

More than that, MINUSTAH sent soldiers and forgot that every young person “separated” from armed groups needs a new “job,” investment, and reintegration. And, finally, investments in the Haitian National Police were meager.

First of all, Haiti's problems are infrastructure, work, health, and education. No gang co-opts young people who have options that value them more. The people know what kind of support they want. I've been stopped on the street countless times by people asking me, not for food, despite being hungry, but for payment of their children's school bills.

In recent months, we have seen, once again, Haiti being on the agenda of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), an economic and political cooperation bloc in the region created in 1973, after the independence of several former European colonies and which today has 16 member countries and 1 observer country, Cuba. After listening to all the political groups present there in a search for mediation, the bloc now proposes a Provisional Presidential Council for Haiti, with 7 members from different political groups in Haiti. CARICOM’s proposal includes a clear point: that all members of this Council agree with the “non-UN” mission approved by the UN Security Council in October 2023.

It is an attempt for Haitian political agents to give approval and a free hand for a new mission to enter the country that has suffered so much from fill-in missions, one of the main reasons for the current situation. This mission proposal, in fact, was requested by a provisional prime minister, Ariel Henry, under US guidance, and considered illegitimate and demoralizing, as it did not achieve either of its only two objectives in its more than two years in power: improving conditions of the country's security and organizing elections.

In fact, it is worth remembering that Henry is accused of being linked to the same gangs that invaded the prisons and is seen as illegitimate and suspicious by a large part of society, as he was appointed by Jovenel Moïse, a former president who, at that time, whose term had already ended and continued in power until July 7, 2021. On this date Jovenel was mysteriously murdered, precisely three days after the appointment of Ariel Henry as Prime Minister, in a crime that has not been clarified to this day, with several signs of obstruction of justice and without having all of its possible perpetrators investigated.

Demanding that a Haitian must agree with the mission to be a member of the Council has a name: international blackmail and new political imposition. It is an attack on the sovereignty of these people, absurd anywhere in the world, normalized when it comes to Haiti. So far, no government in the world has publicly taken a stance against the imposition.

I once participated in a colloquium here, organized by Haitians, where more than 50 local and global organizations together analyzed MINUSTAH in depth, with the testimony of hundreds of victims. After the colloquium, a People's Court was organized where state crimes were judged. None of the bodies responsible for the mission were present.

Now, without evaluation, without accountability, without justice, without self-criticism, a new mission has been proposed, along similar lines, and perhaps worse, with a “non-United Nations” character. Would this be a way to avoid any future liability? It seems that the only conclusion that the UN learned from its experience in Haiti was to protect itself better so as not to be incriminated for its crimes. Why would the head of a foreign police force agree to work in Haiti, knowing that crimes have never been prosecuted here? What reporting, monitoring, and prevention mechanisms would a “non-UN” mission have?

Apparently, Prime Minister Henry's real mission was to direct the arrival of a security force. With this mission almost accomplished, this week he announced that he will leave his position as soon as this Council is established. Kenya, which had volunteered for the mission, suspended its participation after the CARICOM resolution.

The political party Pitit Desalin (Sons of Dessalines), a group historically opposed to the governments that have been in power since 2011 and which sought to be part of the agreement, decided, because of this clause, not to enter the Council and denounce its imposition. According to Jacques Adler, one of the party's members, the idea of the international community there, especially the United States, is that a new mission, along the same lines as the old ones, be imposed. He ends: ‘’a scalded cat is afraid of cold water.” Several groups have denounced that this measure was taken precisely to further divide Haitians, and then accuse them of not being able to reach a consensus.

It is noteworthy that Haitians were initially given 24 hours to decide whether they would participate in the Council and send the names of their representatives. Adler is categorical in saying that the idea of the international community is to “do everything in a hurry, to pass decisions that are not the popular will of Haitians.” The use of the idea of emergency so that measures are approved without the necessary reflection and political discussion raises even more suspicions that the USA, Henry, and the gangs are acting together so that the worsening of acts of violence becomes the main argument for the installation of a new mission.

More questions remain: Why are there no efforts to invite more important local political actors to the table? Today I woke up to a comment from one of them, who feels excluded: ‘’Have the seven international mind slaves already been chosen?’’ Does CARICOM believe that its decisions will be accepted by groups that were never included in the debate?

With this blackmail we see that, even when serious local politicians have some possibility of dialoguing in international decision-making spaces, this happens in a previously delimited, restricted, and manipulated way. What level of sovereignty and what democratic transition does the international community really expect for Haiti?

This all makes it clear how politicians in Haiti, including Henry, continue to look like pieces in a chess game that the United States, France, and Canada largely determine. In this game, Haitians seem to be pawns and the first to fall when they have finished providing their services in the name of the kings.

The current situation recalls 20 years ago, a period in which a president elected by a large popular majority, according to him, ''was kidnapped and deposed'' by external forces, replaced by a temporary president, who then requested a peace mission to this same external community. This mission, in fact, remained in the country for 13 years and brought us directly to today's catastrophe.

To date, Brazil has not expressed interest in participating in the new UN mission in the Caribbean country. Behind-the-scenes information says that Brazil does not evaluate MINUSTAH's results positively and, furthermore, it was this mission that was responsible for catapulting a series of military figures into national political life.

Brazil continue to have a certain local relevance for a reason: its place in the hearts of Haitians, despite everything. Brazil's support for legal migration with a humanitarian visa, among other cooperation projects in the country, is undeniable. But when are we going to act in an emphatic and planned way so that Haitians can stay in their country?

Since Brazil and the United States have different views about the first Black Republic and the character of these missions, doesn't Haiti deserve to be a point of contention, just as Palestine has been? Could Brazil not propose and lead other forms of South-South, anti-racist, and anti-colonial cooperation?

 

*Neno Garbers has lived in Haiti since 2012, where he is a researcher, professor, correspondent and mediator of Non-Violent Communication.

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.

 
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