Aug 28 2026| Nº. 219

Editorial

Datafolha shows Lula with 39% of voting intentions against 33% for Flávio Bolsonaro in the first round and, in a potential runoff, 47% to 43%. BTG/Nexus shows an even narrower gap in the second round, with Lula at 46% and Flávio at 45%, a statistical tie. Despite the differences between the polls, both point to a polarized race with little room for error.

It is in this context that this week’s meeting between Lula and the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies, Hugo Motta, and the Senate, Davi Alcolumbre, takes on particular significance. The meeting resulted in an agreement to move forward in Congress with an agenda that includes ending the so-called “small imports tax,” reducing the 6x1 work schedule, and advancing the Public Security constitutional amendment. The agenda also includes legislation on critical minerals and a special tax regime for data centers. These are distinct proposals, but several of them directly address voters’ everyday concerns: cost of living, working conditions, and public security.

Beyond the substance of the proposals, the meeting reveals an important dimension of Lula’s political strategy in the final stretch of the campaign. After periods of tension between the Executive and Congress, the president has managed to rebuild channels of dialogue with the leaders of both houses and establish a common agenda just as lawmakers are beginning to turn their attention to their own electoral campaigns. The concentrated legislative session scheduled for next week will also test whether this political coordination can be translated into concrete decisions.

In such a close election, the ability to deliver tangible results may carry electoral weight. Lula enters the final two months of the campaign without the comfortable advantage his political camp would have hoped for, but he is seeking to compensate for that vulnerability by drawing on a longstanding feature of his political career: negotiation, coalition-building, and the ability to bring together actors with different interests.

Highlights

• Interviews and debates. With the official start of this year's election campaigns, debates and candidate interviews have also begun. The two main contenders for the Presidency—Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro—opted not to attend the debates, leaving the stage to lesser-known candidates—all of whom belong to various shades of the political right. Individual interviews, however, have been held with all candidates. These interviews, conducted by journalists at major broadcasters, began this week with the lesser-known candidates and have been particularly tough, pressing for details on the proposed government platforms.

• Fear of voting. A report published by the newspaper Folha de S.Paulo reveals that Brazilian voters in the US are afraid to go to polling stations to exercise their right to choose their president this October. The Brazilian community fears that ICE agents might detain and deport voters while they wait in line. According to the newspaper, New York City officials have reportedly helped the Brazilian Consulate find locations for ballot boxes that do not require outdoor lines, thereby minimizing the risk of detentions.

• Economy. Brazil's unemployment rate hit its lowest level since 2012, based on data covering the period from May to July of this year. The rate fell by 0.3 percentage points over the quarter, settling at 5.3%. This positive labor market news contrasts with negative economic indicators, such as persistently high interest rates, high household debt, and a surge in corporate bankruptcy protection filings. From an electoral standpoint, the economy has been a key element of candidate Flávio Bolsonaro’s opposition platform against President Lula.

• Dark Horse. The Supreme Federal Court ruled this week that the São Paulo Civil Police must transfer data to the Federal Police regarding an investigation into the financing of an American film titled “Dark Horse”, which aims to tell the story of Jair Bolsonaro. The São Paulo-based investigation centers on suspicions that businesswoman Karina Ferreira da Gama—owner of the production company Go Up—diverted funds raised by another of her companies, the Instituto Conhecer Brasil (which held Wi-Fi service contracts with the city government), to finance the film. Meanwhile, the federal investigation seeks to determine whether three lawmakers from Flávio Bolsonaro’s party diverted budget amendment funds to finance the movie. Furthermore, Flávio was recorded asking businessman Daniel Vorcaro—a key figure in the “Master case” —for funds for the same purpose. There is also suspicion that funds intended for the film were used to finance the Bolsonaro family's political lobbying efforts in Washington.

• Lulinha. Fábio Luis Lula da Silva—President Lula’s son—remains a central figure in the case that has caused the most political damage to his father's presidential campaign so far. The Federal Police have been releasing, in dribs and drabs, the contents of messages sent by lobbyist Roberta Luchsinger to various contacts. In these messages, she mentions the president's son, implying his involvement in influence-peddling with companies seeking lucrative contracts with the Federal Government. Three cases involving mentions of Lulinha are currently before the Supreme Federal Court. His defense team refutes the accusations, claiming they are intended solely to damage Lula politically. The president, for his part, says it is up to his son alone to explain himself.

News from the Alliance and partner organizations

 Democracy. The Pacto pela Democracia (Pact for Democracy) issued a statement advocating for the participation of all presidential candidates in election debates. The letter addresses the absence of the two main figures in the race: Flávio Bolsonaro and Lula. “Holding electoral debates is fundamental to strengthening democracy and ensuring that voters have access to different proposals and plans for the country,” the organization states. Read the full statement.

Big Tech. The regulation of Big Tech’s activities within the Brazilian electoral landscape was the subject of an important opinion piece published this week in the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo by a group of civil society organizations that monitor the sector. The authors advocate for the creation of permanent channels for technical dialogue among the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), platforms, academia, and civil society, as well as mechanisms allowing for greater external oversight of plan implementation. Read the text written by representatives from Internet Lab, Conectas Direitos Humanos, Aláfia Lab, and Instituto Democracia em Xeque, among other organizations.

Cerrado and babassu palm forests. A recent report by Amazônia Real documents increasing territorial pressure on babassu nut breakers and quilombola communities in Penalva, Maranhão. For 26 years, around 180 communities have been waiting for the establishment of the Enseada da Mata Extractive Reserve—an area of ​​approximately 8,500 hectares in the Baixada Maranhense, a transition zone between the Amazon, Cerrado, and Mata dos Cocais (Palm Forest) biomes. Meanwhile, communities are reporting the installation of electric fences and locked gates that restrict access to productive babassu areas, as well as deforestation, pesticide use, and buffalo farming that damage vegetation, soil, and water sources. The conflict threatens not only land access but also the traditional extractive practices upon which these families depend for food, income, and cultural continuity. The case illustrates how delays in territorial protection can exacerbate environmental degradation and the conflicts affecting traditional peoples and communities.

Cerrado and Caatinga. COP17 of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) takes place from August 17 to 28 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, bringing together representatives from the Convention’s 197 member countries, including Brazil. The conference once again places land degradation, drought, and their links to the climate crisis at the heart of the international agenda. For Brazil, this discussion involves two biomes already showing clear signs of this process: the Cerrado and the Caatinga. As highlighted by an AMEDI campaign, the crisis is already being felt across these territories through the loss of vegetation and moisture, altered rainfall patterns, and reduced water availability. These transformations impact farming, livelihoods, and the communities' ability to remain on their land. Traditional peoples and communities are intimately familiar with these changes and must be central to the response to desertification.

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Article

Trade Pressure and Political Intervention Converge in U.S.-Brazil Relations

By Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli* and Lucas de Souza Martins**

This article was originally published at the WOLA website and was kindly provided by the authors for reproduction in the Brazil Office Alliance newsletter.

Just 47 days before Brazil’s first-round election, U.S.-Brazil relations have entered a particularly sensitive period. What was framed as a trade dispute has increasingly converged with Brazil’s 2026 presidential campaign, raising concerns about U.S. involvement in domestic politics. Since the Trump administration confirmed a 25 percent Section 301 tariff on Brazilian goods alleging unfair trade practices in mid-July, and an additional 12.5 percent tariff in late July as part of a Section 301 action alleging forced labor in many of the world’s economies, trade, diplomacy, and electoral politics have become increasingly intertwined.

On July 20, the U.S. granted permanent residency to Eduardo Bolsonaro following his conviction over efforts to persuade U.S. officials to sanction Justice Alexandre de Moraes since he was the judge who convicted his father for plotting a coup to stay in power after losing the 2022 election. While residency does not prevent extradition, the move underscores the Trump administration’s continued involvement in the Bolsonaro family’s legal and political disputes.  

The electoral dimension sharpened the next day, when presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro told foreign ambassadors that Brazil’s electronic voting system was unreliable. Some diplomats reportedly saw the remarks as laying groundwork to challenge the October election results if Lula wins reelection. Observers also drew parallels with Jair Bolsonaro’s similar 2022 meeting with ambassadors, which contributed to his disqualification from public office. Flávio defended his father’s actions as legitimate concerns about electoral transparency, prompting several parties to consider legal action against him.  

Concerns about direct U.S. involvement also intensified after reports that State Department officials Riley Barnes and Samuel Samson sought visas to visit Brasilia from July 27-30 to meet officials, religious leaders, and Flávio Bolsonaro and discuss electoral integrity and freedom of expression.  

Although the State Department called the visit routine, Brazil’s Foreign Ministry denied the visas, reportedly citing concerns about U.S. involvement in the electoral process.   
The failed visit also drew criticism in Washington. On July 28, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democrats accused the Trump administration of promoting election conspiracy theories about Brazil, evidencing concerns about the Trump Administration’s actions.  

Brazilian media also report that the U.S. Consulate in São Paulo held closed-door meetings with conservative digital influencers on free expression and the digital environment. The lack of explanation about the purpose of these meetings and the participants’ role has fueled further scrutiny of U.S. political engagement in Brazil’s election process.  

On July 29, the Trump administration renewed the national emergency on Brazil under Executive Order 14323, reiterating accusations against Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court and its treatment of Jair Bolsonaro. While imposing no new measures, the renewal preserved the legal framework for further U.S. action.  

The crisis escalated on August 4, when the State Department revoked the visa of Brazilian Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti—the first such action in more than two centuries of U.S.-Brazil relations. A State Department spokesperson called it a reciprocal action tied to Brazil’s delay in approving Daniel Perez as the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil and said Viotti would regain her visa once Brasília approved Perez. Brazil repudiated the decision as a deliberate escalation inconsistent with a relationship historically based on mutual respect. 

Brazilian opinion may also be shifting away from Washington. A July 24 PoderData survey found that most Brazilians favor stronger trade ties with China, now Brazil’s largest trading partner, while 42 percent said a Trump endorsement would hurt a presidential candidate. 

Argentina and China React to Developments That same week, Brazil’s geopolitical strains deepened. On July 25, Javier Milei attended the Liberal Party convention in São Paulo nominating Flávio Bolsonaro, then criticized Lula and Justice Alexandre de Moraes, prompting Brazil to recall its ambassador from Buenos Aires. 

Days later, Lula spoke with Chinese President Xi Jinping, who publicly backed Brazilian sovereignty and opposed foreign interference. Combined with shifting trade and public opinion, U.S. pressure may be accelerating Brazil’s economic and diplomatic tilt towards China. 

Taken together, these developments point to a Brazilian campaign season increasingly shaped by foreign actors. The U.S. becoming one of the protagonists in the October elections. This helps explain Brazil’s more assertive diplomatic posture and Beijing’s framing of its ties with Brazil around sovereignty and opposition to external interference. 

*Lucas de Souza Martins is a professor of U.S. Politics and Global Affairs. He holds an M.A. in U.S. History from Georgia State University and is a Ph.D. candidate at Temple University, specializing in U.S.–Latin America relations. A trained journalist from Mackenzie University, he previously served as a press officer at the Brazilian Senate and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) in Brasília. A former research fellow at the Wilson Center and the Carter Center, he is a consultant on Brazil with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).

*Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli is the Director for the Andes at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), where she leads the work on Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina. For over 25 years, Ms. Sanchez has worked to advance human rights, social justice, and peace in the Americas. She holds an MA from Johns Hopkins SAIS and a BA from Columbia University. She is currently a PhD candidate at Bircham University.

External articles express the opinions of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Brazilian Alliance or the editors of the bulletin.