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Washington Brazil Office

Nov 03 2023 | Nº. 91

Editorial

Late last week, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declared that the federal budget for 2024 need not be balanced. In doing so, he contradicted the stated intentions of Finance Minister Fernando Haddad, who has insisted that it is possible to erase the country’s budget deficit by next year through a series of revenue-raising initiatives, including tax reforms that would primarily affect the wealthiest Brazilians. While Haddad has made budget cuts a much less prominent part of his overall budgetary plans, some in the Workers’ Party (PT) have worried that his excessive concern with a balanced budget would compromise the government’s hopes of accelerating economic growth through federal investment programs.

Both positions in this debate have their strengths. Haddad argues that an explicit commitment to a balanced budget would placate investors and ultimately produce a more stable economic and political environment. Growth might be slower in this scenario but it would be steadier and more durable. The counterargument holds that meeting Haddad’s lofty goal of a balanced budget next year would require cuts in government programs that the Lula administration is counting on to spur job creation and reduce inequality. If the government fails to deliver economically, this thinking holds, it could empower dangerous opposition forces that still enjoy a considerable degree of popular support. “I am not going to set a fiscal target that forces me to start the year by cutting billions in projects that are a priority in this country,” Lula told reporters last Friday. On Monday, it fell to Haddad to walk back the most damaging implications of Lula’s comments: “My role is to seek fiscal balance. I will do that while I am in this position. It is not due to pressure from the financial market. I believe that Brazil, after ten years, needs to look at public accounts again.” Haddad maintained that Lula remains committed to sound economic stewardship but that, if necessary, he would adjust his fiscal plans to balance the budget as quickly as possible. 

This is not the only matter on which the government was divided this week. On Wednesday, November 1 Lula approved a so-called Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) decree that will deploy federal troops in key ports and airports in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The Lula administration has scrambled in recent weeks to present a concerted response to the efforts of organized crime, which have asserted itself in increasingly destructive and public ways. Lula and other members of the Workers’ Party reportedly opposed using the military in this fashion, fearing it would empower armed forces that have not uniformly shown themselves to be stewards of democracy. The president was ultimately convinced this week by Justice Minister Flávio Dino and Secretary of Defense José Múcio. 

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Highlights

  • BOLSONARO CONDEMNED. The Superior Electoral Court has convicted Jair Bolsonaro of abuse of economic and political power. The former president was found guilty of turning the celebrations of the 200th anniversary of Brazil's Independence on September 7, 2022 into a campaign rally for his own re-election. The penalty is ineligibility to run in any election for eight years. The effect is more political and symbolic than practical, as Bolsonaro had already been declared ineligible by a similar previous decision linked to the fact that he held a meeting with foreign ambassadors to spread lies about electronic voting machines and the Brazilian electoral system.

  • GENERAL PUNISHED. In addition to Bolsonaro, Brazilian army reserve general Walter Braga Netto was also declared ineligibility to run for office for eight years. He had been Bolsonaro's minister and candidate for vice president on the Bolsonaro ticket in the 2022 elections. Previously, he had been a federal intervenor in Rio de Janeiro, appointed to the position by former president Michel Temer. Braga Netto is one of the exponents of the group of far-right military personnel who entered politics. He intended to run for mayor of Rio de Janeiro in the 2004 local elections. Both Braga Netto and Bolsonaro will only be able to run again in 2030.

  • MILITARY ON THE STREETS. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva published a decree authorizing the employment of armed forces personnel in ports and airports in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The technical name of the measure is Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO). The acronym in Brazil refers to exceptional military operations in which the armed forces perform police functions within the country. At least 3,700 military personnel will participate in actions aimed at combating organized crime. When he assumed the presidency a year ago, Lula had promised not to use the GLO. Now, it has been demanded by supporters, who in the past have associated this resource with the militarization of society and heavy-handed policies, typical of the right and extreme right in Brazil.

  • COUP D'ETAT. Bolsonaro tried to place a group of people involved in the failed coup d'état attempt on January 8, 2022 inside the official residence of the Presidency of the Republic, the Palácio da Alvorada. The then president's intention was to prevent some of the most prominent figures from coup movement from being arrested at that time. The information was given to the Federal Police by a lieutenant colonel of the Brazilian army named Mauro Cid. He was President Bolsonaro's aide-de-camp and closely followed the then president's actions. Cid was arrested, accused of forging Bolsonaro's COVID vaccination cards, in addition to being involved in embezzling jewelry from the Office of Presidency of the Republic. He signed a plea bargain agreement and, since then, has been handing behind-the-scenes information about Bolsonaro to the Federal Police.

  • BLACK CAUCUS. The Brazilian Chamber of Deputies will now have a formal Black caucus. The formation of this caucus allows black congressional representatives to act as a bloc in the so-called leadership meetings, which are called by the president of the Chamber to analyze matters on the agenda in plenary sessions and in committees. Black people make up 56 percent of the Brazilian population, but only 26 percent of federal legislators are Black. The issue of Black underrepresentation in Brazilian legislatures was the subject of an article by WBO associate researcher Andrew Janusz, published in issue 90 of the bulletin.

 

NEWS FROM SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS:


COURSE OF VIOLENCE.
The Sou da Paz Institute published this week the second edition of the analysis Costs of Armed Violence in the Unified Health System (SUS), which shows that Brazil spent the equivalent of US$ 8.2 million of the public health budget on hospital admissions resulting from gun violence. Men represent 89.6 percent of victims. Black people make up 57 percent of those hospitalized with this profile.

BLACK MOVEMENTS. This week the WBO highlights the intense coordination it has been carrying out to support and expand the participation of organized civil society in actions aimed at the issue of racial justice in Brazil and the United States. News on the website highlights a series of activities carried out in partnership with 14 organizations in the sector, since the formation of the Working Group on Racial Justice in December 2022.

COP. On November 9th, the Instituto Clima e Sociedade will hold the event entitled “International Meeting on COPs: Lessons, Legacies and Expectations for COP 30.” The intention is to exchange experiences and accelerate preparation for the 2025 COP that will be held in Belém do Pará in northern Brazil. The meeting will be broadcast online and simultaneously translated. Registration can be made by using this form.

ERRATA: Issue 90 of the WBO bulletin reported that the Vladimir Herzog Amnesty and Human Rights Award was created by the Vladimir Herzog Institute. The information is wrong. The creation of the award precedes that of the institute.

 

Feature Article

by Rafael R. Ioris

Trump, Bolsonaro and the Frustrated Attempt at Automatic Alignment under the Aegis of Authoritarian Neoliberalism

The surprising elections of the tragic figures of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro to their respective presidencies of the United States and Brazil should be read as expressions of a broader crisis of liberal democracy derived from a long process of promoting an atomistic ideology of society based on the neoliberal policies of the 1990s.

But although they ran their campaigns based on criticism of the limits of current democratic representation, once in power, what these leaders did was to deepen an authoritarian, individualistic, and exclusionary vision, increasingly dependent on the promise of easy and fallacious solutions to complex problems that each nation has been facing in recent years.

And even though they share the same logic and political ideals, and even though they have tried to bring their countries closer together, at least on a discursive level, under the aegis of an almost automatic alignment sought by Bolsonaro, such a project has not offered any concrete gain to Brazil. Rather it has actually deepened the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the two countries in addition to having acutely tarnished Brazil's international image.

These are some of the main arguments of the analysis that Roberto Moll Jr. and I, respectively professors at the University of Denver in the United States and at the Universidade Federal Fluminense, outlined in the article “Trump and Bolsonaro: Neo-Fascist Expressions of the Frustrated Attempt to Redefine the Asymmetrical Relations between Brazil and the USA,” that was recently published (in English) in the academic journal Estudos Ibero-Americanos.

We also argue that although they presented themselves as outsiders in the political system of their respective countries, the viability of their anti-systemic narratives was based on the fear of change and the very idea of multicultural democracy, as well as on the vague promise of reconstructing a mythologized neoconservative past.

In this sense, when they resume the neoliberal economic agenda, now in even more authoritarian terms than in the 1990s, such undemocratic and demagogic leaders have managed to maintain surprisingly high levels of support amidst contexts continually defined by challenging economic and increasing alarming public health conditions.

But, if Trump and Bolsonaro had a lot in common, the domestic contexts mattered a lot for their desiderata, as well as for the bilateral relationship between their respective countries. If both could be defined as clear representatives of far-right neopopulism, in vogue in various parts of the world, the role of the armed forces in the Brazilian government, a country that never faced its legacy of coup interventions by its military, was something very specific, with developments still ongoing for civil-military relations.

Likewise, if Trump's populism took on a more xenophobic and racist character, Bolsonaro's had a more militaristic and ideological bias, expressing the return of articulations of notions dating back to the context of the Cold War and which seemed extinct in the Latin American scenario. Nevertheless, they have been surprisingly rescued by new right-wing leaders in the region.

Finally, despite sharing an authoritarian political ideology and a self-serving vision of power, it is certain that the situation in each country was very different given the obvious differences between the power resources and role of each nation on the global stage.

Such structural differences did not prevent, however, both leaders from seeking a clientelistic approach, in which the diplomacy of their respective countries began to seek a closely aligned relationship not only between the two nations, but between the two family clans in power.

And even though Brazil presented a line of diplomacy most often defined by autonomy and the defense of multilateralism, it was not difficult for Bolsonaro to seek to realign foreign policy on ideological bases that sought, in an ill-informed and certainly anachronistic way, to guide the defense of Brazilian national interests while fulfilling the role of junior associate member of Trumpist foreign policy. It is clear that part of this derived from the attempt to reverse the gains in the country's multilateral projection over the last few decades.

Even so, founded on a medievalist worldview of the then-chancellor Ernesto Araújo, Bolsonarist foreign policy explicitly assumed the fight against universalist values and argued that a greater rapprochement with the United States on dependent and associated bases would be the best way to articulate Brazil's interests in today's world.

Gains of recent years, such as obtaining greater weight in trade and environmental governance negotiations, should be reversed. The regional sphere of influence should be demobilized. And what should be sought would be the defense (a la medieval crusades) of the values of Western Christianity in the face of the threat (never well defined) of cultural communism. Consistent with the same defense made by similar regimes, such as Viktor Orban's in Hungary, defending Western values does not imply defending a more inclusive vision of democracy, increasingly defined according to restrictive parameters, such as human rights.

And so, as expressions of a broader crisis of liberal democracy, Bolsonaro and Trump never actually sought to offer effective responses to demands for better levels of political representation in the complex societies in which we live. On the contrary, they served more than anything as a means of implementing an exclusionary (neoliberal) economic and (authoritarian) political agenda.

Interestingly, despite their ideological and moral affinities, these leaders were unable to implement more lasting forms of close and subordinate diplomatic alignment – despite how much Bolsonaro tried to do so.

In addition to the structural reasons that did not allow such developments, such as changes in the global economic scenario leading to greater dependence of the Brazilian economy on the Chinese market, the achievements of recent decades of Brazilian diplomacy in terms of projecting the country on the international scene in a more structural and lasting way have certainly served as impediments to such a subordinate approach. It is certain, however, that a possible return of Donald Trump to the US presidency and the growing US-China rivalry will present increasing difficulties for the conduct of foreign policy even for a Brazil no longer under the shameful presidency of Bolsonaro.

Rafael R. Ioris is professor of Latin American history and politics at the University of Denver and a research associate at the WBO. This article was originally published on the Interesse Nacional website, and then reproduced in issue 91 of the WBO weekly bulletin, dated November 3, 2023. To subscribe to the newsletter, simply enter your email in the form at the footer of the article.

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.

 
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