May 30 2025| Nº. 168

Editorial

On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a new visa policy aimed at foreign officials accused of aiding in the censorship of Americans, a move widely seen as a direct signal to Brazil amid growing tensions over judicial actions targeting U.S. interests in Latin America’s largest nation. Rubio posted on Twitter/X that the United States would deny entry to officials who purportedly undermine the free speech rights of American citizens. “Whether in Latin America, Europe, or elsewhere,” Rubio stated, “the days of passive treatment for those who work to undermine the rights of Americans are over.” Although the statement did not specifically cite Brazil, recent remarks Rubio made before Congress—where he suggested sanctions against Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes—make the target clear. Moraes has been at the center of allegations from conservative activists and U.S.-based supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro, including his son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, who has relocated to the United States and actively lobbied for such sanctions. In a swift response, Brazil's Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira recognized, on one hand, that visa policy is a sovereign matter while at the same time warning against international interference in domestic affairs.

Behind the scenes, the Brazilian government is scrambling to defuse the escalating diplomatic crisis. According to high-level sources, Brazil’s Foreign Ministry has been pressing Washington for clarification, warning that sanctions against Moraes would be seen as foreign meddling. Meanwhile, Brazil’s Supreme Court has launched an inquiry into Eduardo Bolsonaro’s efforts to solicit U.S. sanctions, accusing him of potentially undermining his country’s constitutional powers. Rubio’s announcement aligns with the narrative being pushed by Eduardo and others that Brazilian democracy is eroding under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and arrives amid a Republican-led push in Congress to pass the "No Censors on Our Shores Act," which would block entry for foreign officials deemed to have violated the First Amendment of Americans. The rift adds new strain to US–Brazil relations, raising the stakes for both bilateral diplomacy and the fragile balance between free expression and sovereign legal authority.

Also this week, controversy erupted when Finance Ministry Fernando Haddad announced a new tax on financial operations on international fund transfers only to reverse the decision hours later, rattling markets and drawing harsh criticism. While Lula and Haddad frequently consult on economic matters, allies say they “don’t truly listen to each other,” with Lula focused on fulfilling campaign promises through expanded social spending and Haddad pushing for fiscal restraint to curb inflation. This clash of priorities has led to repeated policy uncertainty, frustrating both investors and political insiders. Lula’s efforts to stimulate consumption through subsidized housing, utility exemptions, and a forthcoming gas voucher program often contradict Haddad’s goals of tightening spending and maintaining credibility with financial markets. Ahead of what is sure to be a highly contested reelection campaign next year, these internal divisions are making it harder to govern effectively and raising questions about the administration’s ability to present a unified economic strategy.

Highlights

• Military killers. This week, the Federal Police dismantled a criminal group formed by active and reserve Brazilian military personnel who were involved in espionage and contract killings. The group is called Comando C4, which, according to the police, refers to the four letters “C” for “Commando to Hunt Communists, Corrupt People and Criminals”, an allusion to another group that existed during the military dictatorship, the “Commando to Hunt Communists.” One of the documents found contained plans to assassinate Brazilian authorities, including ministers of the Supreme Federal Court, who accused former President Jair Bolsonaro and generals linked to him of involvement in a failed coup attempt in 2022/2023.

• Electoral change. The Brazilian Senate continues to discuss an amendment to the Constitution that provides for important changes to electoral rules, the main one being the end of reelection for the positions of president, governor and mayor. The proposal had already advanced in the Constitution and Justice Committee and was to be voted on in a Senate plenary session but a last-minute change to the text caused controversy, namely, the reduction of the senator's term of office to five years. Currently, the senators' term of office is eight years. The first proposed amendment was to extend it to ten years. The issue remains undecided. To move forward, the proposed amendment needs to be approved in two rounds in the Senate and be passed by the Chamber of Deputies, both in committees and in a plenary session.

• Russian contact. Lula's special advisor for international affairs, Celso Amorim, was in Moscow this week. He participated in a summit that discussed security and cyber attacks. At the meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said he expected Brazil to have a greater “understanding of the fundamental causes” of Russia's war with Ukraine. Brazil will host the next BRICS summit in July in Rio de Janeiro. Whether Russian President Vladimir Putin will participate in the meeting is a mystery, as the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant against him, which should be enforced by Brazil, as a signatory to the Rome Statute.

• Big Tech. The Brazilian Supreme Court is expected to resume next Wednesday, June 3, the trial regarding the Internet Civil Rights Framework, which sets the rules that foreign big tech companies must follow in Brazil. The resumption of the debate comes at a time when the United States is increasing pressure on governments around the world that intend to impose limits on the activities of their technology companies.

News from ABO and social organizations and movements:

Opinion column. In his latest column published in Agência Pública, the WBO Board of Directors President James N. Green, analyzes the foreign policy implemented by Donald Trump during the four months of his second term and concludes that “so far, it is difficult to discern a coherent “Trump Doctrine” behind the chaotic way in which he conducts American foreign policy.” For Green, the actions of the current US government are “chaotic” and could lead to the isolation of the country, while at the same time contributing to increasing the personal fortune of its president.

Fellows. Guilherme Casarões, one of the WBO’s associate researchers, gave several interviews this week explaining the sanctions applied by the US against foreign citizens that the current American government considers to be attacking its concept of freedom of expression. One of them was broadcast on the podcast O Assunto, hosted by journalist Natuza Nery.

Environment. A group of more than 40 Brazilian civil society organizations launched an online signature collection campaign to pressure the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Hugo Motta, to block the processing of Bill 2,159/2021. The so-called Devastation Bill exempts business owners from submitting reports on the impact on water resources, allows some businesses to grant environmental licenses to themselves without supervision from a regulatory agency, and relaxes control over agricultural and livestock activities.

Philanthropy. The third edition of the Brazil Donation Survey, produced by the Institute for the Development of Social Investment published this week, reveals that individual donations to NGOs and socio-environmental projects reached R$12.8 billion or US$2.2 billion in 2022. According to the researchers, “the practice of donations has been gaining more and more strength in Brazil”. In 2002, the percentage of Brazilians over 18 years of age and with a family income above the minimum wage who made some kind of donation – whether in the form of money, goods or time – was 84%. In the previous year, this percentage was 66%.

Embargo on Israel. The FNP (National Federation of Oil Workers) and the FUP (Single Federation of Oil Workers) released an open letter to President Lula this week, asking him to suspend the export of Brazilian oil to Israel, as a way of pressuring for an end to military actions against the civilian population in the Gaza Strip. According to the two main unions in the sector, 9% of the oil consumed in Israel comes from Brazil, which exported 2.7 million barrels of the product to the Israelis in 2024.

Feature Article

Beyond the Amazon: The Cerrado (Savannah) Biome and

COP 30

By Dandara Tonantzin*

Amidst the hustle and bustle over the Amazon rainforests, a silent giant is crying out for attention: the Cerrado. The second largest biome in South America, it covers 2,036,448 km² – the equivalent of 22% of Brazil’s territory, spread across ten states and the Federal District (Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Maranhão, Bahia, Piauí, Tocantins, Roraima and Pará). But, in the wake of the heated debates at COP 30, why does the Cerrado remain relegated to the background?

From the first light of day until nightfall, the Cerrado is alive with life. It is home to almost 30% of the country’s surface water, feeding dozens of basins that bathe other biomes. And yet, it lives under the seal of more flexible laws that allow unrestrained exploitation – the legal reserve there corresponds to only 20% of land property, compared to the 80% required in the Amazon. In the areas classified as the Legal Amazon, this rate increases to 35%, but in much of the biome, the logic is clear: to treat the Cerrado as a sacrificial zone.

This is what can be seen in the data from the Annual Report on Deforestation in Brazil, from the MapBiomas network, released in May 2025, which indicates that the Cerrado was the most devastated Brazilian ecosystem in 2024: 652,197 hectares.

Largely because of this, President Lula's goal of Zero Deforestation by 2030 is at risk despite the advances in deforestation in the Amazon region, as found in studies by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) and the University of São Paulo. The Report indicates a 32.4% reduction in deforestation, considering all Brazilian biomes – with emphasis on the Amazon region, which registered a 54% drop between 2022 and 2024. This is data that we celebrate, the result of the efforts of President Lula's government to reverse the previous policy of implementing policies beyond closed doors as advocated by the then Minister of the Environment of the Bolsonaro government. But in the Cerrado the situation is reversed, especially in Matopiba, a region in the northeast of the country that recorded 75% of the deforestation in the Cerrado and 42% of all the loss of native vegetation in the country, as reported by the G1 portal.

The main driver of this deforestation is agricultural expansion. Farms expand, machines plough through trees, undergrowth and roots, and the degraded soil ceases to fulfill its role as a natural sponge. As a direct consequence, springs dry up, the hydrological cycle is broken, and other regions suffer in the wake of the devastation. The São Francisco River, which quenches the thirst of 15 million Brazilians, is already feeling the pressure; the Tocantins basin is losing volume in areas crucial for irrigation; and the Pantanal, one of the largest wetlands in the world, is cooling its exuberance.

But the impact goes far beyond maps and graphs. In the Cerrado, environmental racism is also at work, a thorny bush that is slowly killing vulnerable communities: indigenous peoples, quilombolas, family farmers, and traditional populations. The loss of land and natural resources becomes synonymous with forced exile; the contamination of water and soil, respiratory diseases and chronic health problems; and cultural erosion, the irreversible impoverishment of ancestral knowledge. All of this is accompanied by a symphony of human rights violations.

Behind this bleak picture, there are deep roots: land inequality, which concentrates land in the hands of a few; the lack of legal recognition of traditional territories; institutional discrimination that silences voices; and public policies designed more to favor agribusiness than to protect ecosystems and populations. It is an explosive combination of predatory economic power and state omission.

We can still choose another path. First, by officially recognizing territorial rights – immediate and secure demarcations for Indigenous peoples and quilombolas. We need to ensure the implementation of inclusive public policies that integrate the participation of traditional communities in the management of natural resources. It is also urgent to invest in environmental education, from schools to rural extension programs, to show that conserving the Cerrado means guaranteeing water, a stable climate, and healthy food. Environmental justice needs to advance vigorously. We need to commit to sustainable development that harmonizes agricultural production with standing forests – models of crop-livestock-forest integration (ILPF) have already demonstrated positive results in Cerrado soil.

In the final stretch towards COP 30, the Cerrado expects more than just formal mentions: it seeks solid commitments, ambitious goals, and real funding for its conservation. If we ignore this giant of biodiversity and water sources, we will condemn not only ourselves, but also future generations to a scenario of scarcity, conflicts, and socio-environmental crises. The time to act is now – each preserved tree, each stream that still runs, each community that resists, is a cry for life that echoes beyond the Cerrado.

*Dandara Tonantzin is a federal congresswomn (PT/MG), President of the Amazon and Indigenous and Traditional Peoples Commission of the Chamber of Deputies and coordinator of the Cerrado Defense Group of the Environmental Parliamentary Front

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.