Feb 23 2024 | Nº. 105

Editorial

This week was dominated by fallout from President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s comments comparing Israel’s ongoing war on Hamas with the Holocaust during a press conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In furious response, the Israeli foreign minister publicly lectured the Brazilian ambassador at the World Holocaust Remembrance Center in Jerusalem, and declared Lula persona non grata until the Brazilian president issued a formal apology. Reportedly annoyed that the Netanyahu government was seeking to exploit Lula’s comments for its own political ends, Brazil recalled its ambassador for consultation. 

While Lula has harshly denounced Israel’s actions in Gaza for months, this is the first time he invoked the Holocaust specifically as a comparison. Some in the Lula administration characterized the president’s remarks as a passionate outcry that could spur international action while others in the opposition and in the press denounced them as a misstep that isolates Brazil and distracts from domestic issues. The fact that the Lula administration has closed the door on any public apology to the Netanyahu government, however, is telling. It signals that the Brazilian government has decided it is comfortable, if not entirely pleased, with where it has landed vis-à-vis Israel after the weekend.

This was the backdrop for Lula’s meeting on Wednesday with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Brazil for a summit of G20 foreign ministers. “Brazil is a key partner on many issues including combatting the climate crisis and advancing human and labor rights,” Blinken noted on social media, adding that “as we approach 200 years of U.S.-Brazil relations, our ties are stronger than ever.” While the impact of Lula’s Holocaust comment is unlikely to do lasting damage to his administration or Brazil’s international standing, it did temporarily distract from another major news story this week. On Thursday, former president Jair Bolsonaro was set to testify to the federal police regarding his role in anti-democratic plotting culminating in the January 8, 2023 insurrection. While Bolsonaro’s lawyers advised him to invoke his right to remain silent, the embattled former president has called for a demonstration this Sunday in São Paulo as a show of force. It remains to be seen how much he can still mobilize supporters.

Highlights

• ECONOMY ON THE RISE. Brazilian federal revenue broke a historic record in January. Since the beginning of measuring these statistics in 1995, the federal government has not collected such a high amount in a single month: it was R$ 280.64 billion (US$ 56 billion), which represents an increase of 6.67% in relation to January 2023. The improvement was caused, among other things, by the approval in December of the so-called “offshore law,” which taxes investments that the super-rich maintain abroad. Another good news was the revision of the Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth projection from 1.60% to 1.68% in 2024.

• RUSSIAN CHANCELLOR. President Lula received Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at Palácio da Alvorada on Thursday, February 22. According to an official note from the Brazilian government, Lavrov expressed support for Brazil's bid to occupy a permanent seat on the Security Council and reinforced the invitation for Lula to be present at the BRICS Summit (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) scheduled for October. The note also says that “President Lula reiterated the position that Brazil remains willing to collaborate with efforts in favor of peace.”

• U.S. SUPPORT. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken,also expressed support for the proposal to expand the UN Security Council. The Blinken’s speech, as well as Lavrov's comments on the topic, are in line with a Brazilian claim that has been presented since at least Lula's first term, which began in 2003.

• TWO-STATE SOLUTION. According to the Brazilian Chancellor Mauro Vieira, there is consensus among all members of the G20 on the creation of two states – one Israeli and the other Palestinian – as a way of resolving the current conflict in the Gaza Strip and the tensions that have exist in the region since 1948. Vieira affirmed that the Security Council reform proposal also has unanimous support from the 20 countries that are part of the group.

• BOLSONARO TRIAL. On Tuesday, February 20, the Brazilian Supreme Court denied the request that had been made by the defense attorneys on behalf of the former president Jair Bolsonaro to remove Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes from judging the case of the frustrated coup attempt on January 8, 2023. The defense argues that Moraes cannot be, at the same time, judge and victim in the law suit since he is mentioned in messages exchanged between the coup plotters, as being a possible target for arrest if the coup were successful. The Supreme Court's denial of the request made by Bolsonaro's defense is based on the fact that the plot was not against the person of Alexandre de Moraes, but against the institutions of the Supreme Court and the Superior Electoral Court, which Moraes also oversees.

• UNPRECEDENTED LEADERSHIP. This week Federal congresswoman Erika Hilton, from the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL), founded in 2004 by leftwing dissidents of Lula's Workers' Party (PT), became the first trans woman to lead a party caucus in the Congress. In the 2022 elections, she and congressional representative Duda Salabert from the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) became the first two trans women to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the Brazilian congress.

• END OF THE “SHORT LEAVE.” After the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate has now also approved by majority the bill that ends the so-called short leaves (saidinhas), the name given in Brazil to the benefit that some prisoners with good behavior obtain, which consists of being able to leave the prison and be with their families on some commemorative dates of the year. Although data shows that more than 90% of prisoners return to their cells, the unpopularity of the measure prevailed in the vote to abolish the provision. The bill now returns to the lower house, which must ratify the proposed legislation. In the end, it goes to President Lula, who can either sign the bill or veto it.

• DEATHS IN BAIXADA. The number of deaths in police operations in Baixada Santista on the southern coast of São Paulo reached 31, the total of all cases so far in the month of February and 54 since the beginning of the operation two months ago. Police have intensified operations in the region after the recent death of police officers. This is already the biggest number of killings committed by the São Paulo police since the Carandiru case in the city of São Paulo when, after a prison riot, the police killed 111 inmates. The police launched the current operations this summer, a period in which the region's beaches receive a lot of visitors and seven months before municipal elections, in which right-wing and far-right candidates will showcase the spectacular security measures they support as a means of winning votes.

• POLITICAL REFLECTIONS. On Wednesday, February 21,  Guilherme Derrite, the Secretary of Public Security of the government of the state of São Paulo, changed 34 of the 63 colonels who have command positions in the military police, including Colonel José Alexandre de Albuquerque Freixo, the second most important person in the chain of command. Brazilian newspapers have reported widespread dissatisfaction with the police. Furthermore, they spoke of a possible mobilization of those dissatisfied with Derrite’s performance to force him to leave office. Instability affects public security, which is the most strategic and vital sector for projecting the image of the Brazilian right in a year when municipal elections will take place.

NEWS FROM WBO, ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:

UN IN GENEVA. The WBO will be present at the 55th session of the UN Human Rights Council, which takes place in Geneva, Switzerland from February 26 to April 5, 2024. The organization will monitor the debates and facilitate participation from Assessoria Popular Maria Felipa, an entity that supports more than 300 victims of torture in the Brazilian prison system every year.

CERRADO NETWORK. The WBO announced this week that Rede Cerrado has affiliated with the organization. The Cerrado Network is an organization that addresses the socio-environmental threats that affect the tropical savannah (Cerrado), fights for the conservation of this important Brazilian biome, and works in defense of traditional communities that inhabit these locations. Rede Cerrado is the 58th organization affiliated with the WBO. Check out the full list.

DEATHS IN BAIXADA. The 31 deaths caused by the police in the month of February in the Baixada Santista region, along the southern coast of the state of São Paulo, were the subject of an article written by Carolina Ricardo, from the Sou da Paz Institute, and by Samira Bueno, from the Brazilian Forum for Public Security. They argue in the Trends and Debates section of the Folha de São Paulo newspaper that the state government invests in violent and highly visible actions to obtain political and electoral gains, instead of giving preference to more discreet strategies of investigation and combating crime.

WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS. All groups, collectives, entities, movements, networks and organizations of women and/or feminists that work to guarantee women's rights in Brazil are invited to register on the recently launched Collaborative Map of Brazilian Women. The Ministry of Women and the National Council for Women's Rights hope to use this registry to guarantee an inclusive and diverse preparatory process for the Fifth National Conference on Public Policies for Women, which will take place in 2025.

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. The Pact for Democracy is organizing a meeting in São Paulo on February 27 to discuss the 2024 elections. The event is restricted to the 200 organizations that make up the Pact network and will serve to discuss the electoral context; exchange ideas about the period; and share projects, actions, and campaigns aimed at the next municipal elections.

Feature Article

By Dawisson Belém Lopes

US-China Power Struggle and Its Ripple Effects in Brazil and Latin America

The current geopolitical scenario in Latin America is marked by the intensifying competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, the two global superpowers. This essay, crafted from a Brazilian viewpoint, delves into the historical backdrop, evolving dynamics, and collateral effects of this power struggle in the region. From my angle, the situation appears to be highly consequential.

Commencing this analysis with a bold theoretical assertion about Latin America, one can rightfully claim that the region distinguishes itself as the most Westernized portion of the Global South. It exhibits common features with the Occident in terms of religion, language, legal institutions, market capitalism, and representative democracy—a trend that is notably evidenced by Brazil. Building upon this premise, various reverberations may manifest.

Since the early twentieth century, the United States has played a significant role as Latin America’s primary trading partner, surpassing Europe and solidifying its position as the region’s most influential external actor. However, this trend gained further momentum in the twenty-first century when China outpaced the United States as the main export destination for Latin American nations. Unsurprisingly, this foreign policy alternation has brought about myriad implications in this part of the globe where we live.

Latin America, except for Cuba, remained under the umbrella of the United States during the Cold War and chose not to join the Non-Aligned Movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Brazil, albeit consistently adopting a third-worldist foreign policy, especially from an economic perspective, deviated from the Bandung Conference approach by aligning diplomatically with Washington.

While China has augmented its presence in Latin America through investments and trade bonds over the years, this change has never meant an inexorable retreat in political influence for the United States. Not to mention that Washington maintains a cultural edge in the region: walking through the streets of Managua, Bogota, Asunción, or Rio de Janeiro, one would not observe anything resembling a “Chinese way of life;” quite the opposite.

However, the decline in the US share of global GDP, dropping from 40-45% in 1945 to a meager 14% in 2023, mirrors Latin America’s gradual distancing from White House worldviews. This is evident in voting patterns at the UN General Assembly. In the case of Brazil, during the presidential administrations of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-50) and Juscelino Kubitschek (1955-60), the country’s representatives aligned with American diplomats at a rate of 90%. Nowadays, the convergence percentage between Brazil and the US is not much higher than 25%. This general trend applies to the rest of Latin America as well.

Still, there’s an additional layer to consider. Since the early 1970s, when mainland China replaced Taiwan at the United Nations, Latin America, and Brazil, especially in the context of votes at the UN General Assembly, have shown proximity with Chinese delegates. This connection has a fundamental rationale: both the People’s Republic and Latin American countries have, for decades, shared similar concerns related to development, finance, peace and security, decolonization, international law, and other issues. Such diplomatic like-mindedness cannot be downplayed.

Another crucial factor to note, given the increasing polarization of global affairs, is the assertive position taken by countries like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico regarding today’s international conflicts, such as those in Ukraine and Gaza. It can be argued that the region is no longer issuing a blank check to the West/US, indicating resistance to unilateral influence. Against this international security background, the waning ability of the United States to co-opt Latin America serves as a cautionary signal.

As the United States and China vie for influence through strategies like friend-shoring (encouraging companies to shift manufacturing away from authoritarian states and toward allies), near-shoring (the practice of relocating business operations to a nearby country), and decoupling (divesting from a country), Brazil and Mexico emerge as net beneficiaries. The United State designates Mexico as its preferred trade partner and investment destination, while China directs substantial investments to, and imports commodities from, Brazil. All in all, both Brasília and Ciudad de México have plenty of reasons to be content with the current state of affairs.

Buenos Aires, on the other hand, faces the risk of distancing itself from Washington and Beijing. Despite the welcoming tone towards the West struck by the recently inaugurated president Javier Milei, Argentina has previously committed to agreements and initiatives, hinting at a pro-China stance. The transition ahead may not play out as seamlessly as Milei’s campaign discourse implied. The ongoing dynamics of the US-China competition will undoubtedly continue to shape the geopolitical future of the nation, and only time will reveal the full extent of its impact.

As Lula’s Brazil resists becoming a merely passive recipient of external influence, the unfolding scenario can signify his third mandate’s litmus test. Accusations of implementing an anti-US or anti-Western foreign policy may be seen in a different light, suggesting that the Brazilian president is navigating with pragmatic ambivalence the US-China arm wrestling while pursuing an autonomous diplomatic approach. After all, proactiveness and self-assuredness should not be misconstrued as a defiant or non-collaborative attitude.

*Dawisson Belém Lopes is a professor of international and comparative politics at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) and a research fellow of the National Council for Technological and Scientific Development (CNPq) in Brazil. He was a visiting academic at the University of Oxford’s Latin American Centre (2022-23) and a SUSI scholar on US foreign policy at the University of Delaware (2021).

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.