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The first official week of Brazil’s presidential campaign served, above all, to confirm what the pre-campaign period had already suggested: the election is deeply polarized, statistically tied, and open to either of the two leading candidates. A new Nexus poll shows Lula at 41% and Flávio Bolsonaro at 37% in the first round, with a potential runoff at 46% to 45%, within the margin of error. More importantly, nearly nine out of ten voters in both camps say they have already made up their minds. There is little new in the starting picture, and precisely for that reason, the question of what might disrupt this balance becomes increasingly important. The first developments of the campaign have also confirmed that corruption allegations will occupy a central place in the race. On one side are the cases and investigations affecting Lula’s inner circle; on the other, the controversies surrounding Flávio Bolsonaro and sectors of his political base. In an election this close, new allegations, investigations, or revelations could carry disproportionate weight. At the same time, relations with the United States remain part of the electoral agenda, both because of recent diplomatic tensions and concerns over foreign interference, as well as the Bolsonaro camp’s ties with sectors of the international far right. The differences between the political projects represented by the two poles are also sufficiently clear: Brazilian voters are unlikely to reach October without knowing what kind of country each side seeks to represent. The first presidential debate, however, added little to this picture. Lula, Flávio Bolsonaro, and Romeu Zema did not participate, while the three candidates who did — Renan Santos, Ronaldo Caiado, and Augusto Cury — together represent a relatively small share of voting intentions. Even in their absence, Lula and Bolsonaro dominated the discussion. The other candidates spoke mainly about them, against them, or from the standpoint of the polarization they claim they want to overcome. Without the two leading contenders on stage, the debate is unlikely to have any meaningful impact on voters’ choices. This brings us to the question everyone is asking: what can still change the presidential campaign domestically? Here, two variables stand out: the beginning of free electoral broadcasting on radio and television, and the unpredictable factor. For decades, the start of free electoral advertising on radio and television represented a kind of second launch of the election. It was when millions of Brazilians became acquainted with candidates, proposals, biographies, and alliances — and when campaigns with more airtime could rapidly gain ground in the polls. Televised debates also had the power to produce decisive moments, memorable mistakes, and shifts in perception capable of changing the course of an election. Since 2018, however, this logic has lost much of its force in Brazil. Social media, digital platforms, and especially WhatsApp have come to occupy a privileged position in the circulation of political information. Political communication has become permanent, fragmented, and less dependent on the major television networks. Fake news and disinformation have become part of the daily reality of elections. The 2026 campaign itself offers a sign of this transformation: of the thirteen presidential candidates, only four will have access to free electoral broadcasting. Lula will have 5 minutes and 31 seconds; Flávio Bolsonaro, 4 minutes and 20 seconds; Ronaldo Caiado, just over two minutes; and Augusto Cury, only 35 seconds. The other nine will depend essentially on social media and other forms of direct communication with voters. Even so, a statistically tied election could restore some of television’s relevance. Beginning August 28, for 35 days, radio and television stations will devote 70 minutes a day to electoral advertising. Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro will together command most of the airtime available to presidential candidates. In a race in which both candidates’ bases appear firmly consolidated, the challenge may not be to persuade millions of voters, but rather to influence a relatively small segment capable of deciding the outcome. The radio and television campaign begins on August 28. After years in which social media and messaging apps diminished the centrality of traditional media, television and radio will once again have the opportunity to speak daily to tens of millions of Brazilians. Can they still change votes, reduce rejection rates, or shift an election this polarized? Or will they simply reproduce, on another screen, choices that Brazilians have already made on social media? Beyond that lies the unpredictable factor — everything that cannot be measured or calculated in advance. Do the campaigns have any trump cards to play in the final stretch? Are they preparing any surprise capable of changing the dynamics of the race? Could there be a new form of international intervention being prepared within the global far-right ecosystem? A covert manipulation campaign operating quietly in the darker corners of the web? New Federal Police operations? Artificial intelligence and deepfakes add an unprecedented layer of uncertainty: not only because false content could influence voters, but because of the deeper risk that even authentic content may increasingly be met with suspicion. Today, the web sphere is precisely where some of the most unpredictable factors in an election emerge. Viral phenomena, sudden waves of cancellation, leaks, and lightning-fast digital campaigns can change the direction of a race from one day to the next. We have recently seen this happen in Colombia and Honduras. But the fact remains that nothing so far has been capable of substantially altering the current electoral balance. And so, the drama of this election may ultimately come either from a renewed importance of television and radio in electoral campaigns, or from the tension of waiting — whether justified or not — for events that fall outside the campaign’s usual script.
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