Sep 04 2026| Nº. 220

Editorial

The Banco Master case dominated Brazil’s political agenda this week and acquired an even broader institutional dimension. What began as an investigation into suspected fraud at a financial institution has increasingly revealed the extensive network of relationships banker Daniel Vorcaro maintains with some of the most important figures in Brazilian public life.

The latest chapter began with the decision by Supreme Court Justice André Mendonça to make public a Federal Police report containing information extracted from Vorcaro’s phone. The records include messages sent to a contact identified as Justice Alexandre de Moraes. Two days before his arrest, Vorcaro asked whether he should leave the country and sought information about the investigation targeting Banco Master. The report also identified, in the metadata of a draft contract between the bank and the law firm of Viviane Barci de Moraes, the justice’s wife, an edit attributed to a user identified as “Justice Alexandre de Moraes.”

The revelations are serious, but they do not yet allow definitive conclusions about any potential wrongdoing. The Federal Police did not recover some of the replies to Vorcaro’s messages, and competent authorities will still need to investigate and assess the new evidence.

The case has, however, triggered a crisis within the very institutions responsible for that assessment. Prosecutor General Paulo Gonet questioned the legality of Mendonça’s initiative and requested that this part of the investigation be annulled. Mendonça responded that the full Supreme Court will examine the facts. Chief Justice Edson Fachin has also indicated that the Court will have to address the issue institutionally. In the Senate, Bolsonaro-aligned lawmakers have increased pressure for Moraes’s impeachment, while Senate President Davi Alcolumbre responded by pointing to Vorcaro’s ties to figures within the Bolsonaro camp itself.

On Thursday night, Moraes retaliated by including Mendonça in the controversial "fake news" inquiry. He accused his adversary of acting selectively against political enemies and called on the Supreme Court president to take action against Mendonça. Edson Fachin, for his part, requested that all those involved submit written statements within five days.

This is another factor that makes the case particularly complex amid an election campaign. New information disclosed this week shows that Vorcaro’s connections cut across different sectors of Brazil’s political system. Piauí magazine revealed an additional US$1.6 million transfer to the fund responsible for financing Dark Horse, a film about Jair Bolsonaro that has already caused political damage to Flávio Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign. New reports have also revealed Vorcaro’s ties to other political figures, including Congressman Nikolas Ferreira, a key opposition leader.

A crisis has now emerged. The revelations simultaneously affect the Supreme Court, the Office of the Prosecutor General, public officials, and important figures on both the Brazilian left and right. Vorcaro increasingly appears at the center of an extensive network of access to different spheres of power.

With two months to go before the election, it remains impossible to know who will lose or benefit electorally from this crisis. It could further damage Flávio Bolsonaro, fuel attacks against Alexandre de Moraes (portrayed by the right as an ally of Lula) and against the Supreme Court itself, or deepen a broader perception of an improper relationship between economic power, politics, and public institutions. Much will depend on further revelations, the institutions' response, and each political camp’s ability to construct its own narrative around the events.

The story is moving too quickly for definitive conclusions. In the Vorcaro case, we still do not know where public anger will ultimately be directed or whether it will intensify during the election. What is clear is a serious crisis of confidence in institutions, casting a shadow over Brazil’s judiciary in the middle of the presidential campaign.

In this environment, how the candidates respond to the crisis may become as important as the revelations themselves. For the relatively small group of swing voters, all these complexities may ultimately be condensed into a much simpler question: who is willing to investigate everything? At this point, the institutional crisis surrounding the judiciary has become a factor in the election.

In the coming weeks, a daily struggle will unfold over this small but potentially decisive segment of the electorate. New messages, testimony, judicial decisions, leaks, or investigations could produce effects that polls conducted only days earlier may fail to anticipate. Both Lula and Flávio face the challenge of demonstrating that the crisis does not belong to them, that they know how to respond to it politically, and, at the same time, that they can preserve their consolidated electoral bases.

But a new question is also beginning to accompany the campaign: could the crisis translate into an anti-polarization vote? Some voters are tired of both poles. For them, each new allegation involving figures associated with both camps may serve not as an incentive to cross the polarization from one side to the other, but rather to leave it altogether.

Augusto Cury’s recent rise in the polls creates an opportunity for him to try to associate voter fatigue and the crisis of institutional confidence with the two main poles of the race, Lula and Flávio, and thereby create the conditions for a viable electoral alternative, even though such a strategy would be extremely difficult to implement. Further growth by Cury, even if insufficient to take him into the runoff, could turn him into an important political actor in determining the outcome of a second round and in the broader reorganization of Brazilian politics after the election.

Highlights

• Presidential poll. Lula holds 38% and Flávio 30% in the prompted-response poll published by RealTime Big Data on September 1st. All other candidates polled fall below 11%. In the unprompted (spontaneous) poll, Lula has 33% and Flávio 25%. In a simulated second-round runoff, the two are tied at 44%. Lula defeats all other candidates in runoff simulations.

• Surprise. The poll's notable development was the surge by candidate Augusto Cury (Avante Party), who appears for the first time with 11%—ahead of everyone else except Lula and Flávio. Cury is a Christian physician, millionaire, and self-help author who presents himself as a "third way" alternative to polarization. His rise in the polls raises suspicions regarding the use of social media bots and influencer involvement, practices prohibited by electoral law. In a runoff scenario, Flávio—not Lula—would most likely inherit these votes.

• International observers. The Carter Center announced it will send an observer mission to Brazil to monitor the October presidential elections. The organization initially said it would not send observers because of budget constraints but later reversed that decision. International observers are seen as key to validating the reliability of the voting machines, the fairness of the contest, civil liberties, and respect for the election results, regardless of the winner.

• Digital regulation. This week, the Electoral Court imposed restrictions on the candidacy of Renan dos Santos—a prominent figure in the far-right youth movement—because he used social media accounts to promote his presidential campaign without having disclosed the existence of these accounts to the relevant authorities at the time of his official registration. Brazil prohibits digital platforms from promoting content from candidate profiles. Consequently, they must disclose their campaign accounts so platforms can restrict their reach to followers only. Renan accused the judiciary of persecuting him and raised the issue of equal treatment, noting that other candidates in the same situation were not penalized.

• Setback. Senate President Davi Alcolumbre reneged on a promise to Lula to put to a vote—before the first round of the presidential election—a proposed constitutional amendment ending the "6x1" work schedule in Brazil (six days of work followed by one day off). This was one of Lula's key campaign pledges; he viewed the measure as a "civilizational leap" for the country. Government members believe the measure could still come up for a vote, though some behind the scenes deny this possibility.

• United States. André Esteves, owner of BTG Pactual, and Joesley Batista, owner of the largest animal protein conglomerate, met with Donald Trump on separate occasions to discuss relations between Brazil and the United States. Both have been acting as intermediaries during the most severe political, diplomatic, and economic crisis in the two countries' 200-year history of relations. This week, Lula hosted Esteves and a group of leading Brazilian bankers and business leaders at his official residence. During the meeting, he pledged to exercise greater budgetary discipline should he secure a new term in office.

News from the Alliance and partner organizations

 Foreign interference. The Vladimir Herzog Institute submitted a warning to Supreme Federal Court President Edson Fachin regarding undue interference by the United States in the Brazilian presidential election. "Foreign interference by the United States is already taking place, and there are strong indications that this trend will intensify regarding the Brazilian presidential election and the potential non-recognition of the vote's outcome," the organization stated. Read more.

Fake News. The Pact for Democracy has created a chatbot, available for free on WhatsApp, to answer questions about the 2026 elections. The service relies on information from Redes Cordiais guides. The channel, named “Confia nas Eleições” (Trust the Elections), aims to expand the circulation of accurate, reliable information to counter fake news during the election period. Learn more.

Election news. The Brazil Office Alliance (WBO) and The Brazilian Report publish a weekly newsletter featuring key news, polls, and analysis regarding the Brazilian electoral landscape. Additionally, the partnership includes a bi-weekly videocast in which James N. Green, Chair of the WBO Board of Directors, and journalist Gustavo Ribeiro analyze the election scenario. Subscribe to the newsletter and watch the videocast.

Rare earths. Two members of Instituto Escolhas, Larissa Rodrigues and Sergio Leitão, published an opinion article in Valor Econômico this week on the legal framework for exploring critical minerals in Brazil. The country "has important reserves of these minerals and, therefore, has come to be seen as a potential protagonist of the new low-carbon economy. The risk, however, is believing that the simple existence of these reserves is enough to guarantee the country a leadership position," says the text. Read more.

The Brazil Office Alliance and The Brazilian Report publishes a newsletter every Tuesday with the main news from the electoral process in Brazil, written in an explanatory and analytical way. Click on the banner below to subscribe.

Article

Oil at the Mouth of the Amazon: Present-Day Emergencies, Sovereignty, and Social Justice

By Mahatma Ramos dos Santos* and Ticiana de Oliveira Alvares**

Petrobras's announcement of hydrocarbon discoveries in the Mouth of the Amazon (Foz do Amazonas Basin, FZA) sedimentary basin has brought the oil and gas (O&G) sector's role in national development back to the center of the debate. Amidst a landscape of multiple crises and disputes centered on energy issues, this discovery takes on strategic importance for national sovereignty and security.

The overlap of two geopolitical spheres—fossil fuels and strategic inputs for the low-carbon economy—intensifies arms, technological, industrial, and commercial races, increasing uncertainty about the speed of the global energy transition. This scenario reinforces the perception that fossil fuels will remain strategic inputs for the global energy supply in the coming decades. 

Brazil possesses significant advantages for positioning itself within the emerging energy and industrial landscape. It is self-sufficient in oil, has a highly renewable energy matrix, and possesses a greenhouse gas emissions profile largely linked to land-use changes and illegal deforestation. Furthermore, its territory holds strategic inputs that can drive a new low-carbon industry. This presents us with the challenge of positioning the country—sovereignly and competitively—in the construction of a new domestic and international energy paradigm, in which oil and its production chain serve as vehicles for a just, sovereign, and popular energy transition. 

Oil and natural gas account for approximately 44% of the country's domestic energy supply. Despite recent production records, national O&G output is projected to decline over the next decade.  This challenges us to plan, regulate, and expand exploration activities today to replenish reserves for the future. To enable exploration and production in the Mouth of the Amazon, we must acknowledge its unique socio-environmental characteristics and meet licensing requirements for sedimentary basin assessment and risk-mitigation plans. This process must ensure IBAMA's (the Brazilian environmental agency) autonomy, as well as social participation and consultation, in accordance with ILO Convention No. 169.

If the size of the reserves and the commercial viability of exploration and production are confirmed, a new debate will arise regarding the destination and appropriation of this wealth, as well as its role in national development and for future generations. With this in mind, Ineep and FUP presented the "2027-2031 Oil and Gas Sector Public Policy Platform: Energy Sovereignty and Just Transition in Brazil" to society. In this platform, we highlight the need for long-term energy planning characterized by greater social participation and state coordination regarding the pace of oil exploration and production and the allocation of oil revenues. Consequently, this discovery should be viewed as an opportunity to enhance national energy security and counter the trend of denationalizing the country's reserves.

Furthermore, it should drive regional and sustainable development—particularly in the North and Northeast regions—address energy poverty, and promote projects focused on decarbonization, adaptation, and new low-carbon technological pathways.

Regarding the Equatorial Margin basins, including the Foz do Amazonas, if high exploratory potential is confirmed, the National Energy Policy Council (CNPE) must designate the area as "strategic." This would allow for exploration under the Production Sharing regime, thereby ensuring greater state coordination and enabling Brazilian society to capture the resulting oil revenues. Another important measure is restoring the original institutional design of the production-sharing model, as stipulated in Law No. 12.351/2010. We also propose ending the ANP’s "Permanent Offer" model for exploration blocks to plan the pace of activities in line with the national interest, curb the commodification of Brazil's exploration potential, and reverse the process of denationalizing national reserves.

To ensure a better distribution of the wealth generated, we suggest establishing a Strategic Management Committee for Oil Revenues to enhance the transparency and efficiency of the current fund system; redirecting unallocated revenues from the Pre-Salt Social Fund toward just transition goals; and creating a Just Energy Transition Sovereign Wealth Fund, financed by windfall profits from E&P companies operating in Brazil. The challenge, therefore, is to link the wealth of the oil and gas sector to public instruments that promote national sovereignty, energy security, research and innovation, environmental preservation, social justice, a just transition, and control over the Brazilian Amazon.

External articles express the opinions of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Brazilian Alliance or the editors of the bulletin.