Jul 24 2026| Nº. 214

Editorial

The integrity of Brazil’s electoral process has once again moved to the forefront of the international agenda. Senator Flávio Bolsonaro’s renewed attacks on Brazil’s electronic voting system and his calls for greater international pressure on Brazilian institutions coincided with a mission by a broad coalition of Brazilian civil society organizations to Washington, D.C., aimed at defending the integrity of the electoral process, the autonomy of democratic institutions, and the principle of non-interference in Brazil’s elections.

These parallel developments illustrate two distinct strategies for the internationalization of Brazilian politics. On one side, opposition leaders are seeking to engage U.S. political actors in their criticism of Brazil’s electoral system and institutional framework. On the other, civil society organizations are working to strengthen international recognition of the legitimacy of Brazil’s democratic institutions while emphasizing that political disputes should be resolved exclusively through the constitutional mechanisms established by the Brazilian legal order.

The contrast reflects an important transformation in Brazil’s political landscape. Relations between Brazil and the United States are no longer confined to traditional issues such as trade, security, or foreign policy. They increasingly encompass debates over democracy, electoral integrity, sovereignty, and the rule of law. The international arena has become an additional space in which competing political actors seek legitimacy.

At the same time, renewed criticism of Brazil’s electoral system suggests that confidence in democratic institutions will once again be a defining issue of the 2026 presidential election. Recent electoral cycles indicate that the political contest will extend beyond competition among candidates to include competing narratives about the credibility of the electoral process and the institutions responsible for safeguarding it.

Beyond seeking external support for distinct political projects, the various actors have also begun to contest, on the international stage, the narrative regarding the quality of Brazilian democracy and the legitimacy of its institutions. These strategies carry vastly different forms of legitimacy, and the article appearing further down in this bulletin explores this topic in greater depth.

Highlights

•  Candidacies. The official launch of bids for the Presidency of Brazil marks the week. The two main contenders are Lula da Silva, seeking re-election for a fourth term, and Flávio Bolsonaro, who aims to inherit the political legacy of his father—former President Jair Bolsonaro, currently imprisoned for a failed coup attempt. Lula holds a solid alliance on the left, which should secure him the most radio and TV airtime for campaign advertising. Although Flávio shows promising polling numbers, he still faces skepticism within the far right. Two key political parties in this sector—the Popular Party (PP) and União Brasil—refuse to ally with him, depriving him of television time and access to important regional campaign platforms. In the conservative camp, former Goiás Governor Ronaldo Caiado is the only candidate polling ahead of Lula in runoff scenarios.

• Election polls. Polling firms are facing a tense standoff with the Electoral Court over attempts by Kássio Nunes Marques, the president of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), to impose new regulations on the electoral process. Marques was appointed to the Supreme Federal Court by former President Jair Bolsonaro and assumed the rotating presidency of the TSE precisely during the presidential election period. He went so far as to ban the publication of a poll unfavorable to Flávio Bolsonaro. Later, he proposed creating a ranking of polling firms based on the accuracy of their predictions. The firms argued that they do not predict the future but merely provide a snapshot of the current moment. Finally, Marques now seeks to compel firms to publish detailed information regarding which cities and neighborhoods they intend to cover in their surveys.

• Corruption. The Banco Master scandal continues to generate negative headlines for both the left and the right. President Lula’s camp had to contend this week with progress in the Federal Police investigation into the involvement of Senator Jacques Wagner (Workers’ Party-Bahia) in the case involving Daniel Vorcaro, the former owner of Master. Wagner, formerly Lula’s right-hand man in Congress, was summoned to testify regarding real estate transactions and a large sum of cash found at his home. Meanwhile, Flávio Bolsonaro is attempting to explain why his company issued service invoices to firms linked to Vorcaro and Master. Also weighing against Flávio is the publication of conversations in which he pledges friendship to Vorcaro. The banker transferred millions to finance a film about Jair Bolsonaro; it is suspected that these funds also financed the Bolsonaro family’s lobbying efforts with the Trump administration in the United States.

• Tariff Hike. The Lula administration announced it would allocate R$ 18.5 billion to assist economic sectors affected by the 25% tariff imposed by the United States on Brazil. Trump’s measures are estimated to impact 18% of total Brazilian exports to the US market. Maintaining this aid—dubbed the "Sovereign Brazil" program—is likely to place further strain on an already overburdened public budget. The situation could worsen if Trump follows through on threats to impose an additional 12.5% tariff on Brazilian products, citing deforestation and the use of slave-like labor as justifications. However, this tariff policy is linked to lobbying efforts by the Bolsonaro family in the United States for months, urging Trump to punish Brazil. The aim was to turn public opinion against Lula. In practice, however, this risky strategy ultimately positioned Lula as the primary defender of Brazilian sovereignty. 

News from the Alliance and partner organizations

 Delegation 1. A delegation comprising representatives from 15 Brazilian civil society organizations carried out an intensive schedule of meetings in Washington and New York from July 20 to 24. They met with diplomats from various countries, U.S. senators and representatives (along with their legislative staff), labor unionists, journalists, academics, and local civil society leaders to express their views on issues such as democracy, sovereignty, and the regulation of Big Tech.

Delegation 2. The group held meetings with diplomats from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, as well as representatives from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In Congress, meetings took place with Democratic Representatives Mark Pocan, Joaquin Castro, Chuy García, and Jonathan Jackson, and with the congressional staff of Democratic Representatives Jim McGovern, Sydney Kamlager-Dove, Tim Kaine, and Peter Welch, as well as with Republican representatives. The agenda with local civil society included meetings with AFL-CIO representatives and the hosting of a public event at the Heinrich Böll Foundation regarding the environmental impact of data centers and the influence of social media on democracy, as well as another event concerning the effects of political polarization in Brazil and the role of civil society in elections. Learn more about the delegation.

Public Security. The Brazilian Public Security Forum published its annual report this week, showing an 8.4% drop in intentional violent deaths—reaching the lowest level since the data series began in 2012. On the other hand, the study detected an increase in femicide and police-related fatalities. Fraud and digital scams have become the most common property crime in Brazil, with over 2.2 million registered cases and a nearly 430% increase since 2018. Learn more.

Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous leaders gathered in Brasília this week to call on President Lula to establish a National Indigenous Truth Commission—an initiative seeking to investigate state-committed violations against Indigenous peoples and advance historical reparations. The meeting marked another step in the struggle for truth, accountability, and guarantees that such violations will not be repeated. Learn more

The Brazil Office Alliance and The Brazilian Report publishes a newsletter every Tuesday with the main news from the electoral process in Brazil, written in an explanatory and analytical way. Click on the banner below to subscribe.

Article

When is it Legitimate and legal to Seek Support from the United States and the World?

By Paulo Abrão*

 The lobbying by the Brazilian far-right in the United States in recent months, aimed at imposing tariffs and other sanctions against Brazil and its authorities to obtain internal political and electoral benefits, is illegal. Equally illegal is conspiring internationally against the regular functioning of one's own democratic institutions.

However, whenever this illegality is pointed out, the exponents of this political field resort to a false equivalence to try to justify their conduct. In a deliberately misleading way, they compare the lobbying they are currently promoting in Washington with the public and transparent dialogues established, on the eve of the 2022 presidential elections, between representatives of Brazilian civil society and authorities of the Joe Biden administration, as well as with European and Latin American interlocutors. The intention is evident: to dilute the gravity of their own actions by making it seem that both initiatives are of the same nature. They are not.

The illegality of the Brazilian far-right’s international activities is encapsulated in the ruling handed down by the Supreme Federal Court on June 16, 2026, which convicted those responsible for the crime of coercion during judicial proceedings—specifically because, as the Court acknowledged, they sought to mobilize the U.S. government to adopt economic and diplomatic measures against Brazilian judicial authorities with the aim of coercing them and obstructing the free exercise of their constitutional functions.

None of this bears any resemblance to the dialogues held in 2022.

At that time, faced with the concrete risk of democratic rupture, representatives of Brazilian civil society engaged in dialogue with authorities from the United States, Europe, and Latin America to request something extremely simple: that they reaffirm their commitment to the integrity of the Brazilian electoral system and promptly recognize the election results, regardless of who won.

It was never requested that foreign governments impose sanctions, interfere in the internal political process, or exert any illegal pressure on Brazilian authorities. The request was limited to what constitutes ordinary practice in international relations between democracies: recognizing the results of free, transparent, and legitimate elections.

The very simplicity of this request reveals the gravity of the moment Brazil was experiencing. There were well-founded reasons to fear an attempt at institutional rupture, a fear that, unfortunately, proved justified by the events of January 8, 2023, and the subsequent investigations and convictions of civilians and military personnel involved in plans to prevent the inauguration of the legitimately elected president.

The difference between the two situations, therefore, is not only political; it is legal and ethical.

On the one hand, there is an attempt to weaken democratic institutions through international pressure directed against national authorities, using economic and diplomatic instruments to interfere in the functioning of the Brazilian state. On the other hand, there was an attempt to strengthen the Democratic Rule of Law by encouraging respect for constitutional rules and international recognition of a legitimate electoral process.

In one case, the intention is to instrumentalize international power to constrain democratic institutions. On the other hand, the aim is to strengthen the international legal order founded on the defense of democracy and human rights, and on respect for election results.

This distinction also stems from the profound transformation that has occurred in international relations in recent decades.

For a long time, the prevailing conception was that only states produced international law, negotiated treaties, and conducted diplomacy. Civil society remained practically excluded from this space.

This reality has changed profoundly.

Today, civil society organizations participate in the negotiation of international treaties, present cases before international tribunals, monitor compliance with conventions, influence global public policies, produce indicators used by the United Nations, engage directly with multilateral development banks, participate in climate conferences, are part of G20 working groups, and play a decisive role in the evolution of contemporary international law.

Civil society has become a structural actor in global governance. Its participation has ceased to be exceptional and has become an indispensable element of the legitimacy, implementation, and control of international law.

It is precisely within this context that the work of the Aliança Brazil Office takes place.

For years, we have worked to build and maintain permanent channels for international dialogue—whether in the United States through the Washington Brazil Office or in Europe through the Europa Brazil Office. This was the case in 2022, when we organized missions by Brazilian civil society to Washington and Brussels to engage with officials, lawmakers, and international organizations regarding the risks facing Brazilian democracy. It remains the case in the various initiatives we undertake to defend democracy, human rights, the environment, Indigenous peoples, labor unions, traditional peoples and communities, the Black movement, LGBTQIA+ communities, freedom of expression, and artistic freedom.

In historic moments of heightened democratic tension, civil society has not only the right but the responsibility to make its voice heard beyond national borders. This was true in 2022 in the face of an internal threat to Brazilian democracy. It is true again in 2026, as external pressures are mobilized to weaken the country's institutions. In both instances, international engagement seeks to protect—not attack—the Brazilian constitutional order.

International engagement—whether with the United States or any other country—cannot be criminalized in and of itself. Nor is it the exclusive prerogative of governments, diplomats, business leaders, or political parties.

In a democracy, every civil society organization has the right to build international bridges of dialogue and cooperation.

The criterion distinguishing legitimacy from illegality is not the existence of these bridges, but what traverses them.

When the goal is to strengthen democracy, protect human rights, and defend the rule of law, international engagement is not merely legitimate; it represents one of the noblest expressions of contemporary global citizenship.

Conversely, when these same bridges are used to undermine national institutions, promote sanctions against one’s own country, or seek political-electoral advantages through foreign pressure, one leaves the realm of democratic cooperation and enters the territory of illegality and illegitimacy.

*Paulo Abrão is the Executive Director of the Washington Brazil Office (WBO). He served as Brazil’s National Secretary of Justice. He also served as Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States and as Director of the Mercosur Institute of Human Rights. He was a visiting scholar at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.

External articles express the opinions of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Brazilian Alliance or the editors of the bulletin.