Editorial

While Lula is on his Honeymoon, the Third Way Withers and Bolsonaro Plays with Petrobras

In a move that did not really surprise anyone, former São Paulo governor finally gave in to pressure from his party this week to announce that he will not be running for president after all. While Doria, who is credited with capably managing his state’s response to the pandemic, never made past single digits in the polls, his exit from the race is nonetheless noteworthy in that it will scramble yet again the landscape of the so-called third way. For parties and politicians looking for an alternative besides President Jair Bolsonaro and former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, options are increasingly slim. Senator Simone Tebet of Mato Grosso do Sul, a member of former president Michel Temer’s Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) party, is the latest favored contender. Although she is not well known, she is not saddled by the perception of elitist entitlement that weighed Doria down in a national campaign. Tebet supported Bolsonaro in 2018 but has since become a vocal critic, making a name for herself during the congressional inquiry into the Bolsonaro administration’s handling of COVID-19 last year. She has not explicitly said what she would do in a run-off between Bolsonaro and Lula— still the most likely scenario—but has announced that the incumbent will not have her support.

Concerned about his electoral prospects, this week Bolsonaro fired the head of Petrobras, Brazil’s massive state-owned oil conglomerate. José Mauro Coelho, who had been in the politically sensitive position for only 40 days, was removed after failing to bring down gas prices. The new Petrobras director is an acolyte of Finance Minister Paulo Guedes, the University of Chicago-trained economist who had seen his influence in the administration fade over the past two years before seemingly growing again this year. It is unlikely that there is much Petrobras bureaucrats can do to radically affect the price of fuel. This is because since the Temer administration, Petrobras has linked its prices to the dollar, emphasizing the company’s international profitability—with an eye to eventually privatizing the company—rather than domestic need. Given the very high exchange rate right now between the dollar and the Brazilian real, it makes more financial sense for producers to sell fuel on the international market. This means that gas prices are likely to remain high in the short term, giving Bolsonaro a major headache as he seeks to chip away at Lula’s enduring advantage in the polls.

Lula had a relatively slow week following his wedding on May 18. One notable event, however, was a collective press conference on Monday held by all the heads of political parties allied with Lula going into the campaign. Lula asserted that the meeting, attended by presidents of Lula’s Workers’ party (PT), his running-mate Geraldo Alckmin’s Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL), the Green Party (PV), Rede, and Solidariedade, reflected the urgent stakes of the 2022 election, which he called the most important since the return of democracy in the mid-1980s. Gleisi Hoffman, the current head of the PT, urged the coalition and their supporters “to be attentive and alert the population that everything that comes from Bolsonaro is a lie.” She also called on government institutions to remain vigilant and “take firm action” on fake news and the demonstrated efforts of Bolsonaro and his allies to disseminate fake news. It is not clear that institutions are prepared for what is sure to be an onslaught against the democratic process from forces associated with the president, but as campaign season approaches there is a solid coalition of parties and politicians set to dramatically attract public attention to the president’s maneuvers.

Highlights

• MORO BECOMES DEFENDANT: Sergio Moro becomes a defendant in a lawsuit for alleged damage to Petrobras, the state-owned oil company. Parliamentarians are suing Moro to reimburse the public coffers for suspected losses to Petrobras caused by his performance as the presiding judge in Operation Lava Jato (Car Wash Operation)

• BIDEN AND BOLSONARO: President Jair Bolsonaro met with Christopher Dodd, the U.S. government's special envoy for the Summit of the Americas. Dodd proposed a bilateral meeting with Joe Biden to encourage the Brazilian President's presence at the event. It would be the first meeting between the two leaders.

• ARAS: Augusto Aras, Brazil's top public prosecutor, said President Jair Bolsonaro had not committed a crime when questioning the legitimacy of the voting system or suggesting he might not accept defeat in the October elections, as former U.S. President Donald Trump did in 2020. In an interview with Reuters, Aras, appointed by Bolsonaro in 2019, said that threatening not to accept defeat was political rhetoric and not in itself a prosecutable crime. 

• DYNAMIC DUO: The Lula-Alckmin campaign wants Geraldo Alckmin, the former governor of the State of São Paulo, to address the conservative electorate, leaving the conversation with workers to former president Lula da Silva. In June, Lula is scheduled to participate in a meeting with indigenous people, caboclos, riverine people and rubber tappers in the Amazon to say what he would do in the region if elected to the presidency.

• RISK PREVENTION AND ELECTION SAFETY: Paramilitary and neo-Nazi-inspired groups are on the radar of parties that support Lula's candidacy, which organize professional security and intelligence centers to confront paramilitary groups that are on the move six months before the elections.

• LATEST POLLS: On May 26th, the DataFolha poll shows Lula (Workers’ Party, PT) in the lead with 48% of the votes in a scenario without the ex-governor of São Paulo, João Doria (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, PSDB), who withdrew from the candidacy. Jair Bolsonaro (Liberal Party, PL) has 27% of the votes. Ciro Gomes (Democratic Labor Party, PDT) appears in third with 7%. André Janones (Avante) and Simone Tebet (Brazilian Democratic Movement, MDB) each scored 2%. Pablo Marçal (Pros) and Vera Lucia (United Socialist Workers’ Party, PSTU) have 1% each. The other candidates Felipe d’Ávila (Novo), Sofia Manzano (Brazilian Communist Party, PCB), Leonardo Pericles (Popular Unity, UP), Eymael (Christian Democracy), Luciano Bivar (Brazili Union, União Brasil) and Santos Cruz (We Can, Podemos) did not score. Annulled votes are 7% and undecided 4%.

• THE PSDB’S TERMS: Although the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) and Cidadania (Citizenship) have already decided in favor of MDB Senator Simone Tebet as their presidential candidate, the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), the third party of the alliance, has hardened the game. The PSDB president has set conditions for support for Tebet on obtaining reciprocal support in three states considered crucial for them: Rio Grande do Sul, Pernambuco and Mato Grosso do Sul. The PSDB also has demanded that the vice-presidential nominee on Tebet's ticket be from its party.

Feature Article

Electoral Judges, Entrusted with Safeguarding the 2022 Elections, are Under Siege in Brazil

By Estefânia Maria de Queiroz Barboza and Gustavo Buss

There is a global trend of democracies moving towards autocratic forms of governance, in several different ways. In 2021, V-Dem warned that, in the decade of 2010-20, Brazil ranked 4th among the 10 main countries that advanced in this process of democratic erosion. According to IDEA, “Brazil has the highest number of democratic attributes in significant decline in the world and, since 2016, has been suffering an episode of democratic backsliding”. But the already serious challenges faced by democratic institutions in Brazil have significantly increased as the 2022 elections approach.

Since Jair Bolsonaro’s election in 2018, the Executive branch has attacked the Judiciary, the press, universities, non-profit organizations, and social movements, imposing a significant threat to democratic pluralism in Brazil. Bolsonaro’s government publicly encourages attacks on institutions. More recently, with electoral polls pointing to a possible defeat in October to former president Lula, his discourse escalated. As BBC reported, Bolsonaro proudly shouted in a speech that there were “three alternatives for my future: being arrested, killed or victory” and that “only God will oust me”.

Judicial authorities in Brazil, the Supreme Court (STF) and the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) in particular, face an unprecedented campaign of attacks and mounting distrust. On September 7, 2021, before a crowd of dozens of thousands of protesters, Bolsonaro uttered a series of direct threats to the Supreme Court, extolling disobedience to judicial decisions and threatening Justices. Unfortunately, such presidential attacks have become commonplace in Brazil. Moreover, without any evidence, Bolsonaro publicly claims that the national electoral system can be and has been rigged. He has even stated that the TSE judges are behind such alleged frauds.

Bolsonaro’s political allies have heavily relied on disinformation strategies to delegitimize democratic intuitions. A report by Harvard Kennedy School’s Shorenstein Center observed that “since the beginning of his term, Bolsonaro has remained an agent of information disorder, leveraging his massive audience and making recurring use of bots.” By taking advantage of under-regulated or even uncontrolled digital arenas and social media, the President and his close allies have disseminated false and manipulated information regarding the Judiciary.

As the 2022 presidential election approaches, Bolsonaro’s focus shifted towards the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court (STF) in particular, as a newfound enemy. In a way, these attacks are not surprising, considering the Court’s role in judging lawsuits against people in the president’s inner circle, as well its longstanding defense of minorities’ rights. A conservative like Bolsonaro would inevitably disagree with certain decisions issued by the Supreme Court, and such disagreement could, in principle, be part of what is expected in a pluralistic democracy. In this case, however, Bolsonaro’s attitude is part of a broader pattern of denying checks and balances, with recurring demands to shut down the Supreme Court and even demonstrations of hatred towards individual Justices.

In addition, Bolsonaro’s campaign of undermining trust in the Judiciary is geared towards the upcoming elections. Since the 1930s, Brazilian elections have been overseen by an independent Electoral Justice as prescribed by the Constitution. The Electoral Court (TSE) has the authority to organize the elections and safeguard electoral integrity. Consequently, this Court is expected to act as an obstacle to any president’s attempts to resist alternation of power. Bolsonaro’s attacks on individual STF’s Justices, who are also serving on the TSE, is an attempt to delegitimize and intimidate actors who are fundamental to a peaceful change of power in case he is defeated in October. In his view, Judges “Barroso and Alexandre de Moraes want Lula to be president.” Barroso was the former president of the Electoral Court, and Alexandre de Moraes will be the upcoming president during the 2022 presidential election.

Bolsonaro has repeatedly cast doubt on the electronic ballot system, accusing it of being subject to manipulation by political adversaries, and therefore not legitimate. He has also supported disinformation and false claims alleging frauds in the 2018 elections, even though he himself was the winner. These overt attacks on democratic legality curb and undermine the authority of Brazil’s Electoral Justice. Additionally, there is rising concern among Brazilian civil society – those still committed to the democratic values laid down by the Constitution – of future violent attacks on the Judiciary and even an open refusal, on Bolsonaro’s and his allies’ part, to accept unfavorable electoral results.

The Brazilian Judiciary is under siege as the most critical moment of our post-dictatorial democracy draws closer. Judicial independence, particularly regarding the Electoral Court (TSE), has come to the fore of the public debate. The access to an independent judiciary is a human right, and the existence of independent courts is an internationally recognized precondition to exercising other fundamental rights. The international community should closely monitor the democratic commitments of the Brazilian State so that any disrespect for judicial independence and the results of the upcoming elections will be seen as a democratic rupture with diplomatic consequences.

Estefânia Maria de Queiroz Barboza is Constitutional Law Professor at Federal University of Paraná. She is co-chair of the Brazilian Chapter of ICON-S (International Society of Public Law) and Vice-President of the Italo-Brazilian Professors Association of Constitutional law and Administrative Law. She is also part of the Executive Committee of Demos – Observatório para Monitoramento dos Riscos Eleitorais no Brasil. E-mail: estefania.barboza@ufpr.br 

Gustavo Buss has concluded his LL.M. at the Federal University of Paraná, where he is currently a Constitutional Law researcher at the Study Center for the Constitution (CCONS-UFPR). His is also the Executive Secretary of Demos – Observatório para Monitoramento dos Riscos Eleitorais no Brasil. E-mail: gustavo@sqbadvogados.com 

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.