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Washington Brazil Office

Jun 03 2022 | Nº. 17

Editorial

Bolsonaro, Police Violence, and the Ongoing Attempt to Discredit Brazil's Voting Machines

Ahead of what is sure to be an extremely heated presidential campaign in Brazil, the Federal Police—equivalent to the FBI in the United States—met on Tuesday with the heads of political parties intending to put forth candidates for the nation’s highest office. Brazil is one of the world’s largest democracies as well as a relatively young one. The first direct presidential election after more than two decades of military rule occurred in 1989. Behind in every poll released in the past several months, President Jair Bolsonaro has embraced a strategy of calling into question his country’s ability to carry out a free and fair election. Implicit in this rhetoric is the notion that his opponents will attempt to steal the election, an allegation that is laced with the threat of a coup that could devolve into violence. With these risks in mind, the Federal Police will assign about thirty agents to each presidential candidate. The actual number will vary according to an assessment of the threat level each contender faces at a given time.

While Bolsonaro deliberately raises the temperature of the country’s political climate, inciting his supporters to be wary of democratic processes that might not favor the incumbent, yet another nonpartisan evaluator has formally tested and approved of Brazil’s acclaimed voting machines. In a report sent Monday to Minister Edson Fachin, President of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the Evaluation Committee for the Public Security Test of the Electronic Voting System stated that their results indicate “the maturity of the electoral systems.” The committee is recognized as an authority on the matter of election integrity. As CNN Brasil explained, “the group is composed of 11 members of the TSE, the Federal Public Ministry (MPF), the National Congress, a criminal expert from the Federal Police, two auditors from the Federal Audit Court, a representative from the Brazilian Computer Society and three representatives of the academic community.” This reputable body has found none of the issues Bolsonaro has alleged riddle Brazil’s voting system. The president, however, as recently as this Tuesday, stated unequivocally that he “does not trust electronic voting machines.” This baseless intransigence is almost certain to fuel skepticism among the president’s supporters, which could prove dangerous if the vote ends up being close.

Betting his political chances in large part on the support of police forces, Bolsonaro unsurprisingly came to the defense of authorities involved in a number of high-profile recent incidents. First, he praised a police operation that last week killed at least 25 people in Vila Cruzeiro, a poor working-class neighborhood in Rio de Janeiro. Bolsonaro praised the operation—the second-deadliest police incident in the history of Rio de Janeiro—as a victory against criminals and the drug trade. He had nothing to say about serious allegations of police abuse and innocent people caught in the crossfire. The second case of police brutality that has made major news in Brazil recently involves 38 year-old Genivaldo de Jesus Santos, who died in the Brazilian state of Sergipe after highway police restrained him in a police cruiser after setting off a gas bomb inside the vehicle. Bolsonaro lamented the death but referred to the victim as a “low-life” and criticized the media for always siding with “criminality.” Bolsonaro has made a career out of appealing to the most violent instincts of Brazilian security forces. This is likely to continue through this year. After all, Bolsonaro will want to ensure the support of armed agents of the state ahead of an election he is set to lose but vigorously contest nevertheless.

 

Highlights

ALLIANCE ISSUES: The leaders of the national alliance between the Workers’ Party (PT) and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) are attempting to define the situation regarding regional electoral coalitions in which different center-left parties have more than one candidate in local government races. Currently, at least four states have two leftist names for governorships: São Paulo, Espírito Santo, Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina.

BIVAR IS OFFICIAL: União Brasil (Brazil Union) officially launched the pre-candidacy of Congressman Luciano Bivar, the president of the party, as a presidential contender in the October elections. Allotted the longest amount of TV advertising time and the largest share of resources from the federal Electoral Fund, the party intends to use these monies and a campaign proposal for a Single Tax as a means to increase Bivar’s poll numbers that are stuck at 1%.

MARINA AND LULA: Former Environment Minister Marina Silva of Rede (Sustainability Network) declared again that she is open to talking to former President Lula da Silva about supporting his candidacy and claimed that her endorsement would be the result of the concern to help the country recover from the effect of the Bolsonaro administration’s policies. She has also indicated that she is planning to run for a seat in the federal Chamber of Deputies.

DEBATES I: Bolsonaro defends the presidential debates with pre-arranged questions, but only confirms that he will participate in events for the second-round runoff election. In 2018, Bolsonaro only participated in two debates.

DEBATES II: Lula declared that he is going to debate other candidates prior to the first round, but wants to reduce the number of events. The Workers’ Party pre-candidate believes that three debates for the first round are enough and suggests the simultaneous transmission of the debates among different media pools.

DEBATES III: Candidate Ciro Gomes of the Democratic Labor Party declared: "At a time of serious economic, social, and political crisis, not accepting participation in the presidential debates is a crime against democracy itself."

TEBET: The center-right candidate, Senator Simone Tebet of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, intends to place the fight against poverty and hunger at the center of her campaign. This focus involves the approval of a Social Responsibility Law. She is currently having problems in her coalition because the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) continues to postpone support for her candidacy as long as possible. It is speculated that Senator Tasso Jereissati from the state of Ceará could be her vice-presidential running mate.

SUPERIOR ELECTORAL COURT: Supreme Court Justice Edson Fachin, the current president of the Superior Electoral Court (STE), said that the international community must be on the alert against “frivolous accusations” about the elections. Amid attacks by Bolsonaro, Fachin insists that the voting system “is fully auditable, with several supervisory entities” capable of ensuring their legitimacy.

ELECTORAL REFORM: Dozens of civil society organizations have asked the Brazilian Senate that the proposed New Electoral Code be carefully considered rather than going straight to a vote on the floor of the Senate. They have pointed out that the proposed legislation was approved in the Senate Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship Commission without any debate. Superior Electoral Court President Edson Fachin also sent a letter to the Senate in which he suggested the postponement of the Electoral Reform Law until 2023 in order to prevent legal uncertainties regarding its application this year.

 

Feature Article

Four Years of State Dismantling

By Michelle Morais de Sá e Silva

Since the very initial moments of the Bolsonaro administration, policy experts in Brazil and abroad have realized that long-established federal policies were being either questioned or completely undone. In the famous executive orders known as “revogaços,” (revocations) Bolsonaro extinguished hundreds of previously existing federal executive orders. Some of them were no longer current or relevant, but many were essential to sustaining important federal policies and regulations, such as those that created participatory bodies. Supreme Court Justice Carmen Lucia has recently recognized the extent of ongoing policy dismantling, evoking the image of a “termite attack” on Brazilian environmental policies.

Some may argue that the so-called processes of policy dismantling promoted by the Bolsonaro government are the natural outcome of the democratic electoral process. However, federal policies have not been the only targets of Bolsonaro’s moto of “we have a lot to undo.” Several other elements of the Brazilian state have been somehow challenged, weakened, or completely eroded since 2019, constituting a broader and far-reaching process of state dismantling.

The pursuit of an explicit agenda of state dismantling by the Bolsonaro administration has been manifested in what Cardoso Jr. et al (2022) have called “institutional harassment.” Such diffused and generalized process of institutional weakening has been observed in several areas of the federal government. Indigenous protections, human rights, education, health, culture, and racial justice, to mention a few, have not escaped policy dismantling and institutional harassment.

One of the less salient but most silent dimensions of this process has been the government’s open contempt for civil servants, mimicking Donald Trump’s backlash against the so-called “deep state.” In a recent research project on the federal bureaucracy, Borges and I have identified a pervasive climate of fear amongst federal civil servants, leading many to either leave their jobs, take temporary leaves, ask to be stationed at different agencies, or switch to assignments as removed as possible from their policies of expertise. Our research findings have been confirmed by similar work done by Lotta et al (2022), who have mapped the various tactics of harassment adopted by the Bolsonaro administration, as well as the possibilities of resistance that have been found by some bureaucrats. Unfortunately, our findings have indicated that, as much as some individuals might be willing to resist ongoing state dismantling, in the long run many give up and rather resort to individual “survival” tactics.

From a neoliberal perspective, attempts to reduce the state machinery may seem to be an expected part of the neoliberal playbook. However, what Bolsonaro has mounted in the Brazilian state does not fully conform to neoliberal economic principles—and certainly not to liberal political principles. Bolsonaro’s Economy Minister has been promoting a minimum-state philosophy of sorts, as it excludes reforms related to cutting back expenses on the military, especially when it comes to military benefits and pensions. If on the one hand civil servants are blamed for government spending, on the other hand military personnel have not only maintained their privileges, they have also occupied key political appointments in government, including the position of Minister of Health during the Covid pandemic.

In a country with rampant inflation and increasing poverty and unemployment, the state will be essential to support the population in coping with the results of an ill-managed pandemic. However, a once emerging economy and rising leader in the Global South, Brazil is now back to a stage of deficient state capacity.

Moving forward, the October presidential elections will put the country at a critical crossroads. There is a clear choice between further weakening Brazilian state capacity or reversing to a course of institution-building and policymaking. Even in this latter, more positive scenario, great challenges lie ahead. Re-engaging the federal bureaucracy will be one of them, as it is essential to any possibilities of policymaking and policy implementation. Federal workers, who have been alienated from the policy process for the past four years, will need both reassurances that the period of harassment has ended and a government agenda that motivates them to resume high levels of engagement with their work. All of this must take place, in addition to the challenges of figuring out hybrid work routines and a pressing need for innovation, diversity, and inclusion.

Post-Bolsonaro Brazil will need to grapple with how to simultaneously reduce poverty, face climate change, mourn Covid deaths, and deal with right-wing extremism. In the wake of the past four years of state dismantling, overcoming those issues will entail rebuilding a federal state structure that is now in shambles.

Michelle Morais de Sá e Silva is the Co-Director of the Center for Brazil Studies and Wick Cary Assistant Professor in International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma. Dr. Morais received her PhD from Columbia University and her MA from the International Institute of Social Studies in the Hague, the Netherlands. She is the author of the book Poverty Reduction, Education, and the Global Diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfers (Palgrave Macmillan).

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.

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