Sep 18 2026| Nº. 222

Editorial

The crisis surrounding Brazil’s Supreme Court produced one of the tensest plenary sessions in its recent history. What should have been a relatively narrow discussion over how to proceed with evidence emerging from the Banco Master investigation involving Justice Alexandre de Moraes turned into a confrontation over the very rules governing how the Court should investigate its own members.

The controversy grew more complex as Justice André Mendonça also came under scrutiny for how he conducted part of the investigation involving his colleague Alexandre de Moraes. While some justices argued that the allegations concerning Moraes and questions about Mendonça’s conduct should be examined together, others maintained that the two matters should remain separate. The session quickly moved beyond this procedural dispute: justices exchanged serious accusations, Justice Flávio Dino challenged decisions by Chief Justice Edson Fachin, and the Court’s rotating chief justice itself became part of the controversy. Justice Cármen Lúcia captured the institutional impact when she said the Supreme Court had caused a sense of “civic unease” in Brazilian society.

The outcome was revealing. Convened to address its own crisis, the Supreme Court failed even to decide how it would reach a decision. Dino requested additional time to review the case, suspending the proceedings and leaving both the procedural controversy and the question of a possible investigation into Moraes unresolved.

The episode exposed a broader problem. Allegations of corruption, suspected conflicts of interest, and questions about the impartiality of members of the judiciary now coexist with accusations of selective investigations and internal disputes over jurisdiction and authority. All of this is unfolding as the Banco Master investigation continues to expand, and Brazil approaches its presidential election.

At the same time, two competing electoral narratives are seeking to frame the crisis. One portrays the episode as an effort to shield Alexandre de Moraes from accountability and politically link him to the government. The other interprets it as the result of a selective and politically instrumentalized investigation against the justice. For the international community, however, the central issue is institutional: the Court responsible for arbitrating Brazil’s most consequential constitutional disputes is experiencing an internal crisis precisely when its authority may be especially important to ensuring the normal functioning of the electoral process.

The latest opinion polls suggest that the Supreme Court crisis has already entered the electoral environment, although they do not yet allow us to conclude that it is driving changes in voting intentions. The Atlas/Bloomberg poll, conducted between September 11 and 16, showed a significant narrowing of the gap: Lula rose from 43% to 44.1% in the first round, while Flávio Bolsonaro climbed from 37.4% to 41.7%. In a hypothetical runoff, the two are statistically tied, at 47.2% and 46.8%, respectively. Atlas also found that 49.5% of respondents believe the crisis is more damaging to Lula, compared with 20.9% who believe it hurts Flávio Bolsonaro more. The Supreme Court crisis has therefore become part of voters’ perceptions and coincides with a narrowing of the gap between the two leading candidates. It is not yet possible, however, to establish a direct causal relationship between the Court’s crisis and Flávio Bolsonaro’s gains in the polls.

Highlights

• Corruption and elections. While the intricate legal debate unfolds at the Supreme Court, police investigations into the massive "Master" case continue to expand in all directions. At least five of the ten Supreme Court justices are cited—directly or indirectly—in intercepted phone calls. The intercepts also mention candidates for governor, such as Antonio Carlos Magalhães Neto from Bahia, and for president, such as Flávio Bolsonaro—in addition to current senators, governors, and party leaders. The depth and scope of the case serve to make the election year even more uncertain.

• US interference. During a Supreme Court plenary session, Justice Flávio Dino read several press reports in which anonymous US sources stated that the United States was preparing new hostile measures against Brazil. Meanwhile, Jason Miller, a prominent figure in the Trump movement, posted AI-generated images on social media showing Justice Alexandre de Moraes under arrest. On Tuesday, September 15, attention focused on a White House document sent to the US Congress, in which Brazil was cited as a country failing to do enough to combat organized crime that the U.S. government has designated as international terrorist organizations.

• US interference 2. The newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo reported that, in October 2025, the US government presented Brazil with a document containing 21 demands to lift surcharges on Brazilian exports. One point required that those convicted of the failed coup attempt of January 8, 2023, be allowed to participate in the election. In practice, this meant allowing Jair Bolsonaro—who is imprisoned and ineligible to run—to stand for office. Brazil refused, citing the law. Now, fears are growing that the United States might ultimately deem the elections not "free and fair." 

• Suspicious funding. The Brazilian news site Amado Mundo reported this week that the U.S. organization Rockbridge Network—founded in 2019 by U.S. Vice President JD Vance to raise funds for the far-right—allegedly has financial ties to Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign in Brazil. The reports offer no concrete evidence, such as invoices or transaction records. They rely solely on allegations made by another presidential candidate, Renan Santos, who claims that Rockbridge "got involved in the campaign." Foreign funding of political parties is prohibited in Brazil, yet there are no signs that the Electoral Court is acting on this matter.

• Election polls. In the first round of the presidential elections on October 4, Lula leads (40%), and Flávio Bolsonaro is in second place (34%), according to a Nexus/BTG Pactual poll conducted between September 11 and 13. The incumbent president rose by one point, while his rival gained three points in the "spontaneous" scenario—where voters state their preference without the pollster presenting a list of names. In the first-round "prompted" scenario, Lula rose three points to 42%, while Flávio rose two points to 37%. In the projected runoff scenario (prompted), Lula stands at 47% and Flávio at 46%. A Quaest poll commissioned by Globo shows Flávio at 42% and Lula at 40% in a runoff scenario. An Atlas poll shows Flávio at 47.2% and Lula at 46.8% in a runoff scenario.

News from the Alliance and partner organizations

 Social media reactions. Democracia em Xeque (Democracy in Check) monitors social media activity in Brazil every week regarding key national political issues and the elections. This week’s “Pauta Quente DX” bulletin highlights the fallout from the historic plenary session at the Supreme Court: “The reaction was dominated by the political clash between Moraes and Mendonça, but the public was most interested in the session’s outcome as reported by the press.” Read the document

Feminist candidacies. The group Vote Nelas (Vote for Women) has compiled a database of all female candidates in the 2026 election and created a website where users can, based on their geographic location, find all feminist candidates running for governor, senator, federal deputy, and state deputy. After searching, users can save the corresponding ballot numbers to use on the electronic voting machine on election day. Learn more.

Supreme Court crisis. Pacto pela Democracia (Pact for Democracy)—a coalition of over 230 organizations—sent a letter to Supreme Federal Court President Edson Fachin arguing that “questions regarding conduct, potential conflicts of interest, relationships between public and private actors, and transparency must be addressed by the institutions.” The document reached Fachin on the eve of a special session of the court. Read more.

Cerrado and Caatinga. Leaders of traditional peoples and communities (PCTs) and those of African origin from the Cerrado and Caatinga biomes are advancing in a training process on the Inter-American and Universal Human Rights Systems, in an initiative aimed at strengthening the use of international protection, reporting, and participation mechanisms. The training takes place as Cerrado organizations intensify their national and international articulation to confront the biome's historical erasure in debates about climate, territory, water, and human rights. The course complements other activities, including territorial meetings, information production, public communication, and dialogue with international bodies. Read the statement.

The Brazil Office Alliance and The Brazilian Report publishes a newsletter every Tuesday with the main news from the electoral process in Brazil, written in an explanatory and analytical way. Click on the banner below to subscribe.

Article

U.S. Action Pushes Brazil’s Election Back onto Programmatic Ground

By Paulo Abrão*

Brazil’s presidential election had been increasingly consumed by a crisis that did not originate in the campaign itself. A succession of episodes involving the Supreme Court, the Federal Police, Banco Master, investigations into Supreme Court justices, information leaks, conflicting rulings, and mutual accusations produced an electoralization of the justice system and, at the same time, an even greater judicialization of the election. For weeks, the question of which candidate, platform, and vision for the country will be at stake in October seemed to be losing ground to a crisis that is eroding the Court’s authority.

 Yet, with only days to go before the election, an unexpected paradox has emerged. The Trump administration, precisely by increasing U.S. pressure on Brazil, has helped push the campaign back onto programmatic ground. Not because Washington has any legitimacy to define Brazil’s electoral agenda, but because one of its most recent measures touched precisely on an issue everyone knew would be central to this campaign: public security.

 On September 15, the White House sent Congress its annual determination on major drug-producing and drug-transit countries. Although Brazil was not included in the document’s most negative formal categories, the Trump administration singled it out for criticism. It said the Brazilian government had failed to confront the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV), blamed the two Brazilian criminal organizations for turning the country into a hub for international cocaine flows, and called for tougher measures against them.

 The accusation did not emerge in a political vacuum. In May, during a visit to Washington amid the pre-campaign period, Flávio Bolsonaro asked the U.S. government to designate the PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations. On May 28, following Flávio’s meetings with Trump, J.D. Vance, and Marco Rubio, the U.S. government announced the designation, which took effect on June 5. Flávio publicly celebrated the decision, and members of his pre-campaign said they intended to use the security issue politically during the election.

 None of this demonstrates that the new September rebuke was intended to benefit a Brazilian candidacy. Washington’s intentions cannot be presumed. Officials from Brazil’s Ministry of Justice and Federal Police have said they see a political-electoral dimension to the U.S. statement, but that is the interpretation of Brazilian authorities, not a proven intention of the Trump administration.

 The effect on the electoral agenda, however, can exist independently of intent. For months, we have known that public security would be a major area of programmatic differentiation in this election. No presidential candidacy could make it through 2026 without answering an unavoidable question: how does the Brazilian state intend to confront criminal organizations that control territories, move billions of reais, infiltrate legitimate economic activities, operate across borders, and challenge the capacity of public institutions?

And that is exactly what happened this Friday, September 18. In Rio de Janeiro, Lula responded directly to Trump, rejected the classification of the PCC and CV as terrorist organizations, but said that the country needs to defeat organized crime. At the same event, the federal government and the government of Rio de Janeiro presented joint measures to reclaim territories controlled by criminal factions, militias, and other criminal organizations, involving intelligence, investigation, technology, and coordinated action by security forces.

 The disagreement has therefore become programmatic. The debate now encompasses the legal classification of criminal factions, coordination between the federal government and the states, the fight against money laundering, border control, financial intelligence, international cooperation, and the limits of a foreign power’s participation in Brazilian security policy. Flávio supports designating the PCC and CV as terrorist organizations and closer alignment with the U.S. strategy. Lula rejects that classification and presents a different approach to confronting organized crime. What was becoming an election about possible corruption involving Supreme Court justices is returning, at least in part, to an election about public policy.

 The episode is particularly interesting because, when we think about electoral interference, we tend to imagine campaign financing, intelligence services, indirect propaganda, disinformation operations, or material support for a particular candidate. But contemporary elections take place in a far more complex transnational environment. A foreign power does not necessarily have to tell Brazilian voters whom to vote for to influence an election. It can also acquire the capacity to influence what Brazilian voters will be voting about.

 This is a less discussed dimension of foreign influence. Introducing an issue, changing its position in the hierarchy of public concerns, imposing categories through which it is interpreted, or increasing the political cost of a position can alter the environment in which an election takes place. And this is what makes the Brazilian case particularly paradoxical. The Supreme Court crisis had shifted much of the electoral debate into the courts. U.S. pressure over organized crime is now helping restore a typically programmatic issue to the center of the campaign. Trump obviously did not create Brazil’s public-security problem, nor did he introduce the issue into the campaign. But the U.S. initiative has increased its salience and compelled Brazil’s main political actors to make their positions explicit.

 And this paradox will now reach the United Nations. The controversy has erupted on the eve of the opening of the UN General Assembly. Lula had already made sovereignty and non-interference themes of his international agenda. Following the U.S. criticism concerning the PCC and Comando Vermelho, the fight against organized crime is also expected to feature in his UN address. The government's position combines the defense of Brazilian sovereignty with international cooperation against transnational phenomena, conditioned on respect for international law.

 This combination matters because sovereignty does not mean isolation. Organized crime is transnational, as are the financial flows that sustain it, and these phenomena can no longer be confronted exclusively within a single state's territorial boundaries.
 The Brazilian paradox is that this time, external pressure has helped push the campaign back toward an issue it would inevitably have had to confront. And that does not diminish the importance of sovereignty. On the contrary, it shows that, in the twenty-first century, protecting the autonomy of an election means protecting not only a society’s right to choose its leaders freely, but also its capacity to decide for itself what it intends to decide when it goes to the polls.

*Paulo Abrão is the Executive Director of the Washington Brazil Office (WBO). He served as Brazil’s National Secretary of Justice. He also served as Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States and as Director of the Mercosur Institute of Human Rights. He was a visiting scholar at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.

External articles express the opinions of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Brazilian Alliance or the editors of the bulletin.