Oct 31 2025| Nº. 180

Editorial

Last Sunday, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva met with U.S. president Donald Trump in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit, where the two leaders discussed trade and investment opportunities. According to Lula, Trump “guaranteed” that a long-delayed trade agreement between Brazil and the United States would be finalized soon, signaling a potential thaw in bilateral ties after months of unprecedented friction. Lula described the conversation as “very positive,” noting that both countries stand to benefit from closer economic cooperation. Though no major agreements were announced, the symbolism was significant. When Trump imposed steep tariffs this summer in response to the prosecution of former president Jair Bolsonaro, the Brazilian economy seemed poised to take a major hit. The effects were, in fact, relatively mild, suggesting that Brazil was well-positioned to resist Washington’s heavy pressure. The fact that the two presidents met in person—and their teams already held subsequent meetings to discuss finer points of trade—indicates that the Bolsonaro family’s influence in Trump’s inner circle could be waning.

Even as Lula sought to project progress abroad, turmoil at home commanded urgent attention. In Rio de Janeiro, the death toll from a sweeping police operation in the city’s favelas on Tuesday rose to at least 121, the country’s deadliest such action in decades. The joint federal and state response included the creation of a new office to coordinate efforts against organized crime, following outcry from human rights groups and residents. State officials defended the operation as a necessary measure against heavily armed gangs, but critics accused authorities of using excessive force and perpetuating a cycle of violence that disproportionately affects poor and Black communities. Finance Minister Fernando Haddad also faulted Rio’s governor for not doing enough to tackle the money-laundering operations and other illicit activities that finance organized crime, opting instead for headline-grabbing police incursions that do little to mitigate crime in the long term.

Amid this national reckoning, Congressman Guilherme Boulos was sworn in on Wednesday, October 29 as Minister of the General Secretariat of the Presidency, vowing to “put the government on the streets” and reconnect the administration with everyday Brazilians. A prominent left-wing leader and close Lula ally who came to national prominence as an organizer with the Homeless Workers Movement (MTST), Boulos’ appointment signals the president’s intent to strengthen ties with social movements while pushing back against mounting criticism over inequality and security policy. Coming on the heels of the Rio massacre and Lula’s outreach to Trump, Boulos’ formal elevation captures the balancing act at the heart of Lula’s third term—between diplomacy and domestic unrest, reform and realism. Public security is likely to be a central point in next year’s elections at every level and the Lula government has recognized the need for tangible policy solutions. It remains to be seen if and how it will meet the urgency of this moment.

Highlights

• Human rights. As the hours pass, increasingly numerous and detailed reports emerge about bodies found with signs of torture and execution after the mega police operation in Rio de Janeiro. Witnesses who entered the woods where the massacre too place to collect the victims' corpses report seeing decapitated bodies with their hands and feet tied and with signs of gunshot and stab wounds in the back. Relatives of the victims say that the police executed people who were trying to surrender. The State did not provide assistance to the survivors, nor did it play any role in the collection of the bodies, which were left behind in a wooded area.

• Political repercussions. A group of ten governors from Brazilian states met in Brasília to express support for Cláudio Castro, the governor of Rio de Janeiro. The movement is led by right-wing and far-right governors seeking an alliance in defense of a more violent public security policy in opposition to the proposals of the federal government. Their joint effort is also a way to propose new political messages to the conservative electorate, as a means of overcoming the stagnation caused by the conviction of former President Jair Bolsonaro and recent coup-mongering agendas.

• International connection. The government of the State of Rio de Janeiro passed on information to the United States about criminal organizations operating in the state. The document, delivered eight months ago to the US Consulate in Rio de Janeiro, states that Comando Vermelho is a terrorist organization that also operates on U.S. territory. The information was delivered at the exact moment when the Trump administration declared war on criminal organizations in Latin America, before announcing threats to overthrow the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, and moving troops to the Caribbean coast.

• Ineligibility. In the midst of the massacre in Rio de Janeiro, the Superior Electoral Court has scheduled for next Tuesday, November 4th, the trial of a case that could lead to the removal from office and ineligibility of the current governor of Rio, Cláudio Castro. He is accused of abuse of political and economic power in the 2022 elections. According to the complaint, Castro used employees as campaign workers who had been hired to perform paid public functions. The governor was acquitted in May 2024, but the Public Prosecutor's Office appealed the decision.

• Bolsonaro's trial. The Brazilian Supreme Court has scheduled for November 7th a virtual session to analyze the appeals presented by the defense of former president Jair Bolsonaro and others involved in the failed coup attempt. This phase of the process could last until November 14th, with a few additional days allowed for possible new questions. Therefore, a sentence is expected before the end of the year. Bolsonaro faces a sentence of 27 years and three months in prison. Currently, the former president is under house arrest, but only as a precautionary measure.

News from ABO and social organizations and movements:

Indigenous Peoples. Bernard Duhaime, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, this week congratulated the proposal to create a National Indigenous Truth Commission in Brazil. He highlighted that the request aligns with a suggestion he himself made during a recent visit to the country. The proposal to investigate crimes committed during the dictatorship – but not only during that period – against native Brazilian peoples has the support of the Brazil Office Alliance, and was the subject of conversations held in September and October between a commission of Brazilian civil society organizations and members of the Inter-American Human Rights System in Washington. The visit was organized by the WBO.

Repudiation. A group of more than one hundred Brazilian civil society organizations and movements published a public statement repudiating the actions of the Rio de Janeiro government in the so-called Operation Containment. “The massive loss of life reiterates the pattern of lethality that characterizes the administration of Cláudio Castro, the governor who holds the title of being responsible for four of the five deadliest operations in the history of Rio de Janeiro,” says the document to which the Brazil Office Association subscribes.

Racial perspective. The Geledés Black Women's Institute said in a statement that Operation Containment “transforms Black territories into extermination camps and deprives the Black population of the right to life, dignity, and citizenship itself.” For the organization, “this is not an operation against crime, but the expression of racial terror that makes the idea of ​​democracy unviable” in Brazil. Read the statement. Organizations such as MAB (Movement of People Affected by Dams), Ação da Cidadania, and Sou da Paz also positioned themselves against the operation. Ajor (Association of Digital Journalism) expressed solidarity with the press professionals who are covering the investigation on the ground.

Feature Article

The Complexo do Alemão, Geopolitics, and National Politics

By Alberto Kopittke*

The motivations for the operation in Complexo do Alemão that occurred on November 28, resulting in the murder of 121 people, are much more related to international geopolitics than one might imagine. It is urgent that the federal government propose robust responses to this issue before it is too late.

In recent months, the Trump administration has publicly presented a reorientation in international policy, directing its gigantic war machine towards Latin America, under the pretext of combating what it calls narcoterrorism.

On January 20, 2025, Trump signed Executive Order 14157, which designated drug cartels and other organizations as Global Terrorist Organizations, opening the possibility for the US armed forces to act directly against these organizations.

On February 6, 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio determined that eight international drug trafficking organizations were to be considered terrorist organizations, especially from Central America and Venezuela, determining the start of operations by the US armed forces against these organizations. In May, a US delegation proposed to the Brazilian government the designation of the PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations.

However, the Brazilian government, through Mario Sarrubo of the National Secretary of Public Security, stated: “We do not have terrorist organizations here; we have criminal organizations that have infiltrated society.” He also commented that  Brazilian legislation defines terrorism in a restricted way, linked to religious or ideological motivations that act against the State.

At the same time, in March of this year, Federal Congressman Danilo Fortes filed a bill that classifies Brazilian gangs as terrorist organizations (Bill 1283/2025). On May 27, the Chamber of Deputies approved the request for urgently considering the proposed legislation with the signature of 333 congressional representatives, allowing it to go to a direct vote in an open session of the Congress. A day after the operation in the Complexo do Alemão, the administration of Governor Cláudio Castro (PL) announced that it had submitted a report to the US government detailing the activities of the Comando Vermelho, arguing that it should be classified as a terrorist organization and requesting assistance from the U.S. government.

On the same day, after the operation in the Complexo do Alemão, the governor of São Paulo announced that the State Secretary of Public Security of São Paulo, Guilherme Derrite, would be taking a leave of absence from the Secretariat to assume the rapporteurship of Bill 1283/2025 – a measure that attempts to shield the secretary from the fallout of one of the worst public security administrations in São Paulo, which disorganized the state's Military Police and saw its robbery rates skyrocket to an unprecedented level.

Immediately after the operation in the Complexo do Alemão, social media was flooded with videos associating the origin of the Comando Vermelho with left-wing organizations that fought against the military dictatorship and making inferences about the support of the PT and President Lula for these organizations, calling them narco-terrorists whose objective is to destroy the Brazilian State.

Over the past few months, governments ideologically aligned with Trump have been making moves to authorize the deployment to US bases and the direct action of US special forces in countries, such as Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina, in addition to the positioning of the US naval fleet off the coast of Venezuela under the pretext of combating drug trafficking.

At the same time, the US publicly announced the closure of bases in Eastern Europe, to redirect troops to Latin America, due to the new priorities of the US government, according to an official statement from the US Army.

Therefore, as can be seen, the events in the Complexo do Alemão are much more related to geopolitical movements than may be initially apparent.

How the US Could Help Combat Organized Crime

US support in combating international drug trafficking is very welcome, with concrete measures such as hindering money laundering and international arms trafficking, especially of rifles.

However, the measures adopted by the Trump administration in 2025 go in the opposite direction. Executive Order “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology” (EO 14178), which reduced the state's ability to track transactions in real time, creating an environment of greater financial anonymity, and the Executive Order “Ensuring Fair Banking Services for All Americans,” in which the government determined that banking regulators must remove reputational risk analysis from the criteria used to analyze bank account openings, ended up undermining compliance tools used to prevent money laundering. It also may facilitate the circulation of illicit financial resources from organizations, cartels, and drug trafficking networks in the world's largest financial market.

Regarding rifles, a study by the Intelligence Undersecretariat of the Rio de Janeiro Military Police revealed that 60% of the 638 rifles seized in 2024 by police in the state came from the United States, demonstrating how a US government strategy to combat international arms trafficking could assist Brazil and other Latin American countries.

The Brazilian Federal Government Needs to Act

On the other hand, Operation Hidden Carbon was carried out in Brazil, targeting the financial heart of the PCC (First Capital Command) in conjunction with fintechs and billion-dollar investment funds, conducted in partnership between the Public Prosecutor's Office of São Paulo and the Federal Police.

This operation demonstrated that Brazilian institutions have the necessary capacity to confront the country's criminal organizations. Furthermore, the country has a robust federal penitentiary system, including maximum security facilities, created during President Lula's first government, and a very strong Federal justice system so that the country can provide an effective response to these criminal organizations. However, despite the correct approach to confronting organized crime, the current federal government has lacked a sense of urgency regarding the issue of public security. In fact, criminal organizations have been growing and already exert armed control over 15% of the country's population. This is a critical situation that deserves much greater attention from the government, which has restricted its focus to the discussion of the so-called Security Amendment Bill (PEC da Segurança).

Although this constitutional amendment would be an important instrument to strengthen the integration of security forces, it faces a completely opposition in Congress and has ended up wasting the energy of the federal government over the last two years, leaving (once again) a void in an agenda that the far-right knows how to exploit very well.

Much can and needs to be done, even without the constitutional amendment. During Lula’s second term, for example, the country had the largest security plan in its history, with the National Program for Security with Citizenship (Pronasci), which provided resources and programs for integrated intervention in more than 120 areas affected by crime. At the same time, the Rio de Janeiro government, with federal support, implemented the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs), which had their limitations, but pointed to the possibility of a new type of strategy very different from the operation carried out in the Complexo da Alemão favela, and which effectively sought to remove armed groups from the area.

The fact is that Brazil needs a plan for Rio de Janeiro, a symbolic of national culture and which has in fact become, alongside São Paulo, a city wher. e organized crime is growing in strength.

Here are some practical suggestions that the federal government could take to address this issue in a robust and effective manner:

• Create a community-based program model capable of dismantling the criminal governance of areas by factions while simultaneously providing real security for communities, involving policing resources, social policies (with task forces from federal programs, for example), urban planning, and municipal inspections, drawing on the positive and negative lessons learned from the UPPs, Territories of Peace, and Pacts for Peace.

• Fund the reform of the prison system in Rio (and throughout Brazil) to meet the goals of the National Council of Justice's (CNJ) Fair Sentencing Program.

• Establish a federal prison in Rio.

• Increase the size of the federal police and deploy the necessary number of federal police officers for a robust and long-term plan in Rio, similar to Operation Hidden Carbon, but on a much larger scale, involving suppressing arms trafficking, the money laundering mechanisms of organized groups, and institutional corruption.

• Create a National Anti-Rifle Strategy to combat international arms trafficking, involving ports, airports, and the intelligence of all security, justice, and armed forces institutions.

• Create a National Violence Prevention System, with effective programs for families, schools, and young people, to be implemented in partnership with municipalities.

• Create a permanent Integrated Security Cabinet among the federal, state, and local governments.

• Approve the Constitutional Amendment Proposal on Security.

• Approve the Anti-Mafia Package.

After 50 years of suffering from violence, Brazilian society understandably cries out for concrete and effective answers to the problem of public security. Furthermore, a more robust approach is urgently needed to block the geopolitical movement that has been underway, which uses this serious problem for other interests.

We have another chance; it's best not to waste it.

*Alberto Kopittke is a former director of the National Secretariat of Public Security and a member of the Brazilian Forum on Public Security.

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.