The Serpent's Egg

Ricardo Seitenfus has a PhD in International Relations from the Institut de Hautes Études Internationales of the University of Geneva. He is a professor and author of two dozen books published in Spanish, French, English and Portuguese. He was Vice-President of the Inter-American Legal Committee and Representative of the OAS in Haiti (2009-11) and Nicaragua (2011-13). This article was written by Seitenfus for issue 104 of the WBO weekly newsletter, dated February 16, 2024. To subscribe, enter your email in the field below.


The extraordinary stability of the political map of the Americas stands out when compared to other continents, especially Europe, the birthplace of two world wars. The editors of maps of the Old Continent rejoice as teachers and students are led to incessantly relearn about a fleeting reality. What was true for one generation becomes sacrilege for the next.

Applied to the Law of Treaties in the New World, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, (obligation to comply with what was agreed), the cornerstone of civil law, brought stability and permanence to our territorial borders. Although many of these were the result of bloody conflicts, agreements imposed by the victor, unequal treaties, corruption of diplomatic agents and other ills, they were and are untouchable.

It appears, however, that the historic tradition of inter-American relations is about to be broken by Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro Moros. In an extraordinary move, worthy of the greatest masters of international chess, without noise, without the sound of boots on the ground and armed only with his boldness, he appropriates Essequibo, which is equivalent to 2/3 of the territory of his Guyanese neighbor.

The victim of this South American Anschluss is one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, accused by Maduro of being a usurper in the service of “imperialism.”

A supposed “referendum” was hastily held; whose result, despite not being very competitive, was presented as the electorate's endorsement of the Madurista adventure. In addition to being a grotesque example of the singularities of South American dictators, well described by Gabriel Garcia Márquez, this consultation is an affront to the Law of Treaties. By the way, it has an ludicrous aspect in that the inhabitants of Essequibo or the Guyanese should be listened to and not the Venezuelans.

The theater of the absurd continues. By magic, Essequibo is incorporated into Venezuela with the following initiatives: Petróleos de Venezuela’s monopoly for gas and oil exploration in the region; creation of the High Commission for the Defense of Guyana Essequiba; publication and dissemination of the new map of Venezuela in schools and universities in the country; creation of the Guyana Essequiba Comprehensive Defense Zone; appointment of the sole Guyanese Essequiba authority; and social assistance program for the population and issuance of a new identity card for the citizens of Essequibo. From the outset, they are stripped of their Guyanese nationality and transformed into Venezuelans!

Like every dictator, Maduro has a simple objective: to create an external enemy to better cling to power. When Argentine general Leopoldo Galtieri invaded the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982, he pursued the same objective and made a similar mistake.

Will Maduro have a different fate? With the exception of Washington and London, the rest of the world looks on in amazement, amidst surprised and dubious protests. Some, incredulous and apparently uncomfortable, try to hide their admiration for this work of art of international politics. Among them is Brazil.

“Like every dictator, Maduro has a simple objective: to create an external enemy to better cling to power”

Ricardo Seitenfus, PhD in International Relations

There are, at least, three reasons that make Brasília unavoidable in this crisis. On the one hand, we are the only country to share borders with both contenders and the Essequibo region. Even a possible land military operation must necessarily involve Brazilian territory.

On the other hand, in 1904 Brazil accepted, although unfavorably, the Arbitral Award in the Pirara dispute with the United Kingdom, an integral part of the same Essequibo territorial dispute.

Finally, the most important thing: Maduro's strategy calls into question the intangibility of borders in South America, a founding principle of Brazilian foreign policy built by Baron do Rio Branco.

The uncompromising respect for law as an end and diplomacy as a means made Brazil the undisputed champion of territorial stability. In addition to gains estimated at 900,000 km², the tactic brought security and peace. Also notable was the Brazilian attitude towards the arbitration that did not give what was expected. This happened with the decision of the Swiss Confederation in the dispute to define the border with French Guiana and with the Pirara dispute regarding disputed territories of Roraima and former British Guyana. In both cases, we accept the decisions. What should prevail were the legal foundations and the law, and nothing more.

However, there are signs that the legacy of Baron do Rio Branco is being left aside by the current government in the supposed uproar regarding Essequibo, opening a window for possible future contestations, putting regional peace at risk.

By sponsoring negotiations between the parties, Brasília acts recklessly, granting undue importance to diplomatic means, when it should stick solely and exclusively to legal foundations.

What would these be? The first is respect for the 1899 arbitration that granted the territory to the United Kingdom. The second legal document to be respected in its entirety is the 1966 Geneva Agreement signed between London and Caracas, the validity of which was recognized by Georgetown on the occasion of its independence. Unfortunately, in the desire to free itself from its colony, the United Kingdom agreed to sign the document opening the door to a different judicial decision than that established in 1899. However, it was also defined that it will be solely and exclusively under the auspices of the UN Secretary General that the future of Essequibo will be decided.

Contrary to the response of voters consulted – and manipulated – by Nicolás Maduro Moros, UN Secretary-General António Guterres indicated that the International Court of Justice should rule on the case. This should be the inescapable Brazilian position.

Now is the time for law and not diplomacy. Otherwise, we will be incubating the serpent's egg, as is evident in the refusal of Bolivia and Suriname to sign the Rio de Janeiro Declaration of December 7, 2023, which defends regional peace and advocates a peaceful solution to disputes.


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